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This report is an abridged version of a masterate thesis 
undertaken by Mr B. Borrell under the supervision of Dr A. Zwart 
wi thin the Department of Agricultural Economic s and Marketing 
at Lincoln College. 
The subject of physical distribution of wheat and flour within 
New Zealand addressed by the authors of this report should be of 
considerable interest to wheatgrowers, participants in the market-
ing chain, and New Zealand flour consumers. In that cost reductions 
seem likely by a relaxation of controls on the distribution system, 
it is hoped that this report will attract feedback to enable further 
constructive and more meaningful use of the model that has been 
evolved. 
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The author s would like to thank the Re searc h Di vi sio n of 




SUMMAR Y AND CONCLUSIONS 
The basic aim of thi s study has been to seek a more ration-
alised market structure for the New Zealand wheat and flour industry. 
Cur rent polic y constraints are seen to insulate the market from its 
underlying economic forces. These forces include the economies 
of scale present in the milling and transport sectors of the market 
and inte r- regional competition. The polic y constraints relate to 
the polic y instruments of Government, namel y milling quotas, 
standardised wheat and flour pricing, import controls, and fixed 
inter - regional trade flows. 
The fact that polic y constraints have been insulating the mar-
ket from its true economic forces for a long period has prevented 
structural adjustments within the market. Not surprisingly the 
industryfs problem is seen as one of structural realignment. The 
task of the study has been to seek the location, number and size of 
mills, the inte r- regional trade flow s for wheat and flour including 
the selection of appropri.ate modes of transport, and regional price 
differentials that more accurately acknowledge and align the market f s 
structure with the economic forces of the market. The results of 
the model used to analyse this problem indicate that substantial 
improvements in the marketfs performance could be achieved. 
In chapter two the market structure of the existing industry 
was depicted as di.spersed and fragmented. A market structure 
resembling that of the existing industry was represented using a 
capacitated transhipment model. In this model quantity constraints 
were used to represent milling quotas and other quantitative restric-
tions of the existing industry. The solution of this model provided 
estimate s of the opportunity costs imposed by these constraints. 
This information indicated that the value of short term marginal 
changes that could be achieved by allowing extra bulk shipments 
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to the North Island, and by all owi.ng greater milling at North Island 
mills would be significant. 
To measure the values of possible long term structural changes 
it was necessary to remove constrai.nts from the model and take 
account of potential economies of scale. When transportation con-
straints were dropped and the economies of scale of shipping and 
port handling we re acknowledged, the model showed that $1.87 :r:n. 
could be saved. This represents a saving of 10 per cent over cur-
rent costs of the industry and resulted from transporting all wheat 
to the North Island by bulk ship. This contrasts with the existing 
industry where four modes of transport are used to transport wheat 
to the North Island. 
When milling constraints were dropped, further centralisation 
of the shipping operation became apparent. The solution to this 
problem showed that no flour should be transported from the South 
to the North Island, but instead that extra wheat should be trans-
ported to the North Island by bulk ship and subsequently be milled 
to flour at current mill locations of the North Island. This was 
shown to result in a further cost reduction of $2.26 m. which is 
a further 12 per cent saving over marketing costs of the current 
industry. 
When the scale economies of milling were represented in the 
model, it was shown that further centralising the milling operations 
of the industry would lead to even greater cost reductions. The 
best solution to this problem showed it was only necessary to have 
five mills in New Zealand compared to the current number of 21. 
These were shown to be located at Mount Maunganui, Wellington, 
Christchurch, Dunedin and Invercargill. This resulted in an 
additional cost reduction of $1.84 m., an extra 9 per cent saving 
over marketing costs of the current industry. 
3. 
The total savings resulting from rationalising and centralising 
the transport, processing and handling operations of the industry 
represented, in full, a 31 per cent saving over current marketing 
costs. It was further shown that additional savings might be achieved 
if full rationalisation of the sources of supply for North Island wheat 
could be made. Examples of these savings were shown by allowing 
imports of Australian wheat. Such savings would result in a market 
where competitive spatial equilibrium prices and quantities applied. 
However, as production costs and therefore realistic supply functions 
were not included in the model, the fu,ll impact resulting from spatial 
equilibrium prices could not be determined. For example, it was not 
possible to estimate what savings in transfer costs might arise from 
rationalisi.ng the quantities of wheat grown within different regions of 
New Zealand. In theoretical terms this would further decrease costs 
by also centralising wheat production in New Zealand. 
The increased performance shown to result from the removal 
of policy constraints of the model does not necessarily imply creat-
ing a free market wheat and flour industry. The results establish 
market structure norms for the industry; and they do not imply any 
specific conduct for the industry. They do, however, raise some 
important questions concerning what market conduct might be required 
to achieve the norms suggested by the model. It is in this realm that 
the re sults rai se implications fo r polic y maker sconce rned with New 
Zealand I s wheat and flour marketing policy. In an industry where 
there is a single authority responsible for marketing, the potential 
for directing the industry towards a particular structure exists as 
the central authority has the power to implement and co-ordinate the 




Often the markets of an economy fail to achieve the objectives 
of economic policy. As a result, Government policy makers may 
become involved in the resource allocation decisions of certain 
industries. The expedience of policy makers is to use a variety of 
intervention devices or policy control instruments in an attempt to 
better achieve economic polic y objective s. However, the economic 
implications of such controls on the organisation of an industry can 
be complex, as can be the economic choice between the many feasible 
alternative ways of organising an industry. 
The New Zealand wheat and flour industry is one industry which 
has attracted considerable statutory intervention. Government involve-
ment in the industry is aimed at reducing the inter-year variability of 
wheat supplied to the market and to ensure "orderly" marketing of 
the industry's product. 
Many of the controls used by Government in the wheat and flour 
industry have been in effect since before the inception of the New 
Zealand Wheat Board in 1965. Es sentially, the se control shave 
imposed rigidities on the industry. Although the wheat and flour 
industry is dependent on other markets of the economy which have 
unde rgone enormous technological and economic change, the rigidi-
ties of policy have only permitted relatively small changes in the 
structure and conduct of the wheat and flour industry. For this 
reason, long run organisation changes necessary to maintain the 
marketing efficiency of the industry may not have been able to occur. 
In recent year s, marketing co sts as sociated with as sembly, 
storage, milling and distribution of wheat and flour (the primary 
5. 
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areas of Government involvement) have been significant, totalling 
approximately $20 m. in the year ended 31 January 1979. Because 
of the significance of these costs and because of the effects of the 
current policy controls, a study of the industry's marketing efficiency 
is considered a worthwhile area of study. Accordi.ngly, the primary 
objective of this study is to examine the efficiency of the market 
organisation in the New Zealand wheat and flour industry. 
To achieve this objective a market model is used firstly to 
desc ribe the existing industry and, secondly, to study the effects 
of reducing some of the policy controls. As the current Government 
controls largely effect the spatial organisation of the industry, the 
market model used in the study is designed to examine problems 
concerning transportation, inter-regional trade and facility (process-
ing plant) locations. The model uses the transportation algorithm 
and heuristic procedures discussed in other reports published by 
the Agricultural Economic s Re search Unit (Higham et aI, 1972 and 
Mc earthy et aI, 1972). 
The study includes an examination of the wheat and flour industry 
in New Zealand as it extends from farm gate to baker or retailer. 
In the following chapter the basic functions and problems of the 
industry are discussed. In chapters 3 and 4 a description of the 
model used to represent the industry's problems is detailed. The 
results of this model are in chapter 5. This is followed with a final 
chapter discussing the limitations and policy implications arising 
from the re sults. 
CHAPTER 2 
OUTLINE OF THE INDUSTRY 
201 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the basic functions 
and problems of the industry. This requires a brief examination of 
the basic structure and conduct of the New Zealand wheat and flour 
I 
market. 
2.2 Basic Functions 
The primary function of the industry is to meet New Zealander s I 
inelastic demand for approximately 220,000 tonnes of flour per annum 
(Borrell, 1980, p. 8-9). This demand is regionalised in accordance 
with population density, and is therefore predominantly in the North 
Island with a large proportion of that demand in the Auckland and 
Hamilton regions. This pattern of demand must be satisfied from 
dispersed South Island supply regions or from imported ALlstralian 
wheat. Conside ring the bulky nature of the products, wheat and flour, 
the logistical problem of the industry is a large one. Voluminous 
products must be transported considerable distances to the market 
place. En route these products may require transhipment several 
time s; all wheat must be transhipped in the proce s s of milling wheat 
to flour; transhipment may also be required when different modes of 
transport must be used over long journeys, and other transhipment 
is necessary when either wheat or flour must be stored to bridge the 
gap between harvest time and the period when flour is required by 
consumers up to 10 months later. 




A secondary function of the wheat and flour industry is to 
supply inputs to the stockfood industry. This industry provides a 
market for wheat of inferior quality that is graded as unsuitable for 
milling. It also provides a market for the by-products of flour mill-
ing, namely bran and pollard. In this way the stockfood industry 
absorbs most surplus wheat products. Only rarely has New Zealand 
expo rted any wheat. 
The basic problem involved in carrying out the functions of the 
industry is an economic 0 ne of satisfying the demand for flour at 
least cost. 
2.3 The Basic Problem 
On farm costs, storage costs, transport costs, processing 
costs, and product prices are all market signals which can be used 
to guide the agricultural industry in decisions concerning industrial 
organisation. In theory, only where these guides lack distortions 
and are readily available and understood by entrepreneurs, will they 
relay correct demands to producers within the wheat and flour 
industry, as well as transmitting supply conditions to consumers. 
Under these circumstances the market mechanism will operate to 
co-ordinate internally the allocation of resources. This is a com-
peti ti ve market situation whe re the conduc t of the industry will be 
determined by the forces of supply and demand; prices and profits 
will be at their optimum and output levels and distributional patterns 
will be tho se which enable the market to achieve a Pareto optimum. 
Unfortunately market imperfections are common characteristics 
of agricultural markets and may require some form of external inter-
vention to be corrected. It is perhaps for this reason that the New 
Zealand Government has developed a specific policy of intervention 
in the wheat and flour industry. 
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Although the demand for flour is inelastic and relatively con-
stant from year to year, the supply of New Zealand milling grade 
wheat is variable between years. Accordingly the trade flows also 
vary from year to year and in year s of dome stic shortfall Australian 
wheat must be importt::d. It is perhaps the volatile nature of the 
wheat and flour market that is seen by Government to c reate market 
imperfections, and the subsequent intervention has directly and 
indirectly altered the structure and conduct of the industry from that 
of a competitive market industry. 
204 The Structure of the Industry 
A unique and influential part of the industry I s market structure 
is the presence of a quasi-government marketing authority, the New 
Zealand Wheat Board (NZWB). This authority has complete control 
of the purchase and sale of wheat and flour, including the quantitative 
control of all imports of product under industry control. The Board 
also has complete responsibility for transportation and storage, most 
of which is carried out by farmers, brokers, transport operators and 
the Railways Department under contract to the Wheat Board. Under 
the instructions of the NZWB, brokers organise the movement of 
wheat from Ilon ll or 110££11 farm storage by trucks or trains to either 
local flour mill s, temporary po rt storage facili tie s or to grain 
consolidators. 
From temporary storage facilities 5000 tonne bulk cargo ships 
are used to transport wheat from Blu££ to Timaru to Auckland or 
Mount Maunganui. Cur rently these ships are operated by one ship-
ping company operating under a one year tender contract with the 
NZWB. 
The trade flow s by bulk ship are the predominant movements 
of South Island wheat to the North Island. In years when New Zealand 
10. 
is self- sufficient in wheat production bulk shipments account fo r 
approximately half the traffic of wheat (either as wheat or as flour 
measured in wheat equivalents) to satisfy North Island demand for 
flour. This amounts to approximately 100, 000 wheat equivalent 
(w.e.) tonnes. The remaining 100,000 (woeo) tonnes are transferred 
by train or by container shipping under contract with transport oper-
ators, grain consolidators who prepare the grain for transportation, 
and the Railways Department. 
Approximately half of this remaining 100, 000 (w.e.) tonnes 
destined for the North Island is in the form of flour. This occurs 
because milling quotas allocated to South Island mills by the NZWB 
allow for surplus production in the South Island. There is a total 
of fourteen mill s in the South Island, all of which are located in 
Canterbury or South Canterbury. 
In the North Island there are a total of seven mills. These 
are located at Auckland, Mount Maunganui, Wellington and Palmerston 
North and are larger than most mills in the South Island (see Borrell, 
1980, p. 22). Throughout the country as a whole, mill sizes range 
from those milling less than 4, 000 tonnes of flour per anN-urn to one 
in Auckland milling 70, 000 tonnes per annum. The seven larger 
North Island mill s have a combined annual milling capaci ty of approx-
imately 165, 000 tonnes of wheat compared to 130, 000 tonnes for the 
fourteen South Island mills. 
The allocation of quotas among mills does not vary greatly 
from year to year. It is perhaps for this reason that in y~ars when 
the production of wheat is below a level of self-sufficiency it has 
been the South-North trading in wheat rathel:' than flour that has been 
cut. Bulk ships have been used to servi~e the trading of wheat from 
Australia to the North Islam rather than on the South-North route. 
In the two years (ending 31 January) 1975 and 1976 more than 135, 000 
11. 
tonnes were imported in each year and therefore transported from 
Australia. In 1977 only 10, 000 tonnes was imported from Australia. 
Fe r a full stati stical hi story of New Zealand imports of wheat see 
Borrell (1980, p.2S). 
In summary, the structure of the industry can be described as 
one whe re the marketing operations of transpo rtation, storage and 
milling are each carried out by diverse means. The industry is 
notably decentralised and whilst the Wheat Board is a sole marketing 
and deci sion making authority de signed to integrate and co -ordinate 
the market, still many pri vate and independent or gani sations are 
involved, including farmers, brokers, port authorities, shippers 
and other transport operators, millers and bakers. To this extent 
the structure of the wheat and flour industry is dispersed and frag-
mented. By contrast the conduct of the industry is notably centralised. 
2.5 Conduct of the Industry 
Pricing behaviour of the industry, the geographical and distribu-
tion decisions, the degree of competitiveness or co-operation practised, 
and the adjustments of quality and quantity of the industry's products 
are all aspects of conduct which are determined largely by the Govern-
me nt wheat and flour marketing polic y. In thi s way the conduct of the 
industry is centralised, and is quite different than that which would 
be expected in a competitive market. 
2.5.1 Policy Obiectives in the New Zealand Wheat and Flour 
Industry 
Without being able to determine all the obiectives or measure 
all the separate effects of policy on all groups in society, it is unlikely 
that policy can ever seek socially optimal solutions. However, if 
policy makers can ensure that the measurable benefits arising from 
an industry exceed its measurable costs, this will at least anow 
12. 
policy makers to presume that the set of policies chosen will lead 
to an Lmprovement rather than a deterioration of natio::lal welfare. 
The obvious and measurable primary benefit arising from the 
wheat and flour industry is the supply of flour for New Zealand con-
sumers. The obvious and measurable costs of the industry are the 
financi.al costs relating to wheat growing, transportation, handling 
and processing. If New Zealand consumers' dBmands for the end 
products can be assumed to be completely inelastic and the prospects 
of exporting unlikely, it is reasonable to assume that the ultimate or 
primary polic y objectives of Government for this industry should 
simpl y be to provide the fixed amou::lt of flour requi red by 0Jew 
Zealanders each year at minimum costs. This however, does not 
appear to be the objective actually pursued under the wheat and 
flour marketing policy. 
The precise policy objeetive Government has for the wheat 
and flour industry is not clear. The Wheat Board Act 1965 specifies 
"Self-Sufficiency" as the major objective for the industry. Chudleigh 
et al (978) suggest otherwise. Their study concludes that stable 
prices would appear to have been the policy objective pursued. 
These objectives are only important if they ensure the supply of 
flour at minimum cost, and should be, therefore, at most, inter-
mediate or secondary objectives. 
If primary and secondary objectives have become confused it 
is likely that the minimum cost imperative which is necessary to 
maintain efficiency in the industry has not received the priority it 
deserves. The effect of this on the conduct of the industry might 
best be seen by analysing the effectiveness of the actual policy 
mechanisms which are currently in use in the industry. 
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2.5.2 Policy Instruments 
The Wheat Price 
A mo st important instrument of the wheat and flour marketing 
policy has been the Gove rnment' s fixing of the wheat price. 
The theory of price equilibrium in spatially separated markets 
indicates that prices in different localities should differ by less than 
the transfer cost if the total transfer cost is to be kept to a minimum. 
Trade flow s should then onl y occ ur inte rnationally, inte r- regionally 
or intra-regionally if the cost of transport and hand~ing the product 
does not exceed the price differences that exist in the absence of 
trade. 
Price equilibrium in this sense is not able to occur in the 
New Zealand wheat industry under the existing pricing arrangements. 
Wheat g rowe r s have not received market signals dete rmined by the 
forces of supply and demand of the New Zealand wheat and flour 
industry. Instead, Government have fixed the price to be paid to 
farmers. The Department of Trade and Industry, in collaboration 
with other groups of the wheat and flour industry, have determined 
this price for Government. Even under the new wheat pricing policy, 
whereby the price of wheat is set according to a three year moving 
average of Australian f. o. b. wheat price s, the New Zealand price 
is standardised to all producers, payable at the farmer's nearest 
railway station. The transport costs from this location to either 
the flour mill of destination or from there to a point 35 miles from 
the bakers of final destination, whichever is the greater, are paid 
by the Wheat Board. 
Effectivel y, unde r thi s cur rent pricing ar rangement, individual 
producers in the industry are insulated from the effects of differing 
transport costs. This means North Island farmers in close proximity 
14. 
to mills are confronted by exactly the same set of prices as a 
South Island farmer whose wheat is shipped to the North Island at 
an average cost of $45 per tonne (NZWB, 1978). Similarly at an 
intra-regional level, wheat farme rs growing their product close 
to the Dunedin market receive the same price s as farmers $2 0.00 
per tonne further away at Cromwell in Central Otago. On other 
ag ric ultural commodities, produce rs in mo re remote locations 
incur highe r transport costs in transfer ring their products to market. 
Where farmers are insulated from transport costs, a form of 
cross subsidisation among wheat growers will occur. Farms at 
spatially less favourable locations can grow and sell more wheat 
without incurring additional transport costs. However, this deprives 
those farmers at true spatial advantage from the otherwise higher 
prices required to induce them to produce the wheat those farmers 
in remote locations would not produce, if confronted by spatially 
discounted prices. As a result of this, an opportunity cost, or 
producer tax, is imposed on proximate fanners to provide more 
remote farmers with higher prices or a producer subsidy. The 
consumer bears the burden of the increased total cost of transport 
which arises under such a scheme. 
Another sector of the industry where spatial price equilibrium 
is not allowed to occur is in the flour milling sector. 
Flour Milling Allocations 
Miller s are a£fo rded complete insulation from the co st of 
transport inputs. This, however, would not increase total costs 
for the reasons described above, but it does lead to the substitution 
of more expensive transport inputs of a certain product form (namely 
flour) for the cheaper transport inputs of an alternative product 
form (namely wheat) which would cause costs to be greater. Although 
15. 
flour is only equivalent to 78 per cent the weight of wheat, more 
specialised, more hygienic and therefore, more expensive transporta-
tion is required in transferrLng this product. This would suggest 
that in general wheat should be miIled at the point of final demand. 
Economies of scale experienced in the milling of wheat to flour 
should also be significant factors influencing optimal mill location. 
Both labour, plant (capital) and throughput economies are experienced 
2 
in the flour milling operation in New Zealand. Therefore total costs 
of transport and milling may be minimised by balancing increasing 
per unit delivery costs of flour, against the cheaper per unit costs 
of assembling wheat and the decreasing costs of centralisation in the 
milling operation. This will minimise the aggregate transfer and 
processing costs and will also determine the quantity any mill in one 
locality should produce. Site factors relating to availability of labour, 
the markets for bran and pollard and external economies may also 
have a bearing on the location of mills if price equilibrium were 
allowed to occ ur. 
The current pricing conduct prevents transport, site or 
agglomeration factors from influencing the structure of the milling 
sector in New Zealand. Instead, Wheat Board allocated flour quotas 
dete rmine the location, number and size of mills. The price spaid 
to mill s are de signed mainl y to keep ex! sting mills solve nt, rather 
than encouraging a more suitable industrial structure. The prices 
are calculated on a cost plus basis by the Department of Trade and 
Industry and, since January 1978, individual prices have been set 
to take account of the varying cost structures of the different sized 
mills operating at thirteen localities in New Zealand. Because 
quotas are used to structure the milling sector, pricing conduct is 
only a secondary variable influencing the industry's market 
2 
Personal communication with flour millers and data from NZFMA 
confirms this fact. 
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organisation. However, this is based largely on historical grounds 
and therefore also ignores the essential economic factors discussed 
above. The results of this are best summarised in the comment by 
Judge (1979); 
"Flour milling itself is another example of regulation 
distorting the free enterprise system and ending up 
costing the consume r and the country dearly. Unde r 
the quota system for wheat one mill in the South Island 
was closed for health reasons as its plant and buildings 
were no longer suitable for milling. The mill sold at 
a goodwillfigure in excess of half a million dollars. 
The consumer in the end has to pay for this and many 
other similar windfall profits. The profit arising from 
what are effectively goodwill payments comes only 
from an antiquated licencing system. Many modern 
and efficient mills today are receiving massive subsi-
dies because they are not allowed the throughput to 
keep them fully operative. II 
Al so from the statement: 
'During the whole of the 1976 year, Northern Roller 
Milling Co. Ltd catered for the com:Jined trade of its 
mill and Aulsebrooks Allied Mills Ltd (thought to have 
a capacity in excess of 10,000 tonnes per annum) 
because of the delay in completion of the latter Company's 
new mill. II (11 th NZWB Annual Report, p. 23), 
it is evident that surplus capacity is present in the indlJ.stry and, it 
might be concluded, the allocation of milling capacity requires 
greater rationalisation. 
There is also evidence to suggest greater industrial rational-
isation could be achieved in the allocation of the industry's prOdi..lcts 
between the various modes of transport. 
Transportation 
There are potential economies of scale in both storage and bulk 
shipping that rna y hold implications for what is an efficient transport 
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policy for the industry. Freebairn (1967) and Dickie (1972) both 
report that significant economies of scale can be exploited in storing 
wheat. Sharp and McDonald (1971) and Chudleigh (1978) di.scuss the 
significance of economies of scale in bulk shipping; these can be 
considerable. Finding the optimal size of ship and the optimal size, 
number and location of large centralised storage facilities are com-
plex problems (see Borrell, 1980), only solvable by analysing the 
trad·e -oifs between many inte r - related co sts of many spatial and 
temporal factors. Improvements in the industry's transport policy 
may be possible if these economies of scale were more fully exploited. 
The Wheat Board's current annual contract shipping arrange-
ment results in ships of approximately 5,000 tonnes servicing the 
inter-island and trans-Tasman shipment of a guaranteed 100,000 
tonnes per annum. Al though there are three ships each operating 
thi s route part-time, unde r the pre sent loading and unloading rate s, 
this given tonnage could be enough to approximately occupy one ship 
full-time. 1£ current loading, and particularly unloading rates from 
bulk ships could be increased, a single 5,000 tonne ship could trans-
port substantially more wheat cargo. As the economies of bulk 
shipping involve a large fixed cost component (the capital cost) and 
only mi.nor vari.able costs, extra volume throughput of cargo would 
substantially reduce the cost per tonne of wheat shipped. 
It is apparent that the main facto r cur rentl y reta rding unload-
Lng rates from bulk ships Ln Auckland and Mou!lt Maunganui is that 
ships must discharge directly to trucks. This can take up to four 
days and even longer if bad weather lnterrupts the operation. In 
many ports of other countries discharge of grain from ships is con-
veyed directly to port storage facilities allowing quick turn round 
of ships. 
I 8. 
The cur rent North Island demand for flour require s approxi-
mately 220, 000 wheat equivalent tonnes to be transferred to the 
North Island annually. Although the bulk ocean shipping of wheat is 
probably the cheapest mode of transport available for transferring 
wheat equivalents to the North Island, it has been Wheat Board policy 
to also send wheat and flour by other more expensive modes of trans-
port. This has been considered to give the Wheat Board a flexible, 
multi-mode routing strategy to secure the logistics of the industry. 
Because there are only short-term buffer storage facilities 
in the North Island, flexibility is considered crucial to secure the 
steady flow of wheat and flour to the North Island. Flexibility allows 
the Wheat Board to cover the contingencies introduced by transport 
strikes and hold-up sometimes experienced with current bulk ship-
ping. However, if adequate buffer storage facilities were available 
in the North Island, such contingencies could be les s important as 
large buffer storage could ensure an uninterrupted flow of wheat to 
North Island millso Moreover, without the need for a multi-mode 
routing strategy, the full tonnage of wheat equivalents could be trans-
ported by bulk ship to the North Island, thus enabling the economies 
of shipping to be exploited. This might enable total industry costs 
to be reduced if the savings in transport costs from substituting 
existing transport inputs with the increasingly less costly alternative 
inputs, outweighed the extra but decreasing per unit cost of port 
bu££e r sto rage. 
2.6 Summary 
Because of the nature of Government policy influence in the 
New Zealand wheat and flour industry, the normal workings of the 
market mechanism do not guide the condl.1ct of operators in this 
industry. Whilst Government involvement may be necessary in an 
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industry where the market mechanism fails to achieve economic 
policy objectives, still the underlying economic and market forces 
must not be ignored in designing policy control instruments. 
It has been suggested in this chapter that the current policy 
determined conduct of the industry may be insulating operators 
from several very important, innate economic and market forces. 
The influence of this on the organisation of the industry, it has 
been purported, may have created an inte raction of market conduct 
and structure that has produced a market performance to which sig-
nificant improvem2nts could be made. 
The next chapter seeks to construct a mathematical model that 
incorporates the important economic forces of the wheat and flour 
market. It is intended that thi s model will then be used to anal yse 
which aspects of market structure and conduct might help improve 
the performance of this industry. The model wHl seek to show the 
potential performance of a perfect market. In this model costs are 
minimised in supplying flour to New Zealand consumers. In an indus-
try where there is a single authority responsible for marketing, the 
potential for directing the industry towards such a perfect market 
exists as the central authority has the power to implement and 
co-ordinate the findings of the market model. 

CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY - THE TRANSHIPMENT MODEL 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to embody the theoretical concepts raised 
in Chapter 2 in a mathematical model of the industry. It is intended 
that thi s model be used to dete rmine the industrial 0 rganisation that 
might improve market performance of the wheat and flour industry 
in New Zealand. 
3.2 Selection of Type of Model 
The natlJ.re of the problem discussed in chapter 2 suggests 
that many aspects of Government policy have insulated the wheat 
and flour industry from the economic forces that underlie its markets. 
It is hypothesised that the rigidities of policy have prevented necessary 
structural adjustments occuring in the industry and that the lack of 
structural change may be a factor restricting the market performance 
of this industry. For this reason, a primary feature of the proposed 
model is that it be able to show the long term structural responses 
which might occur i.f the economic forces of the market were able 
to influence the industry. To effectively model and analyse such 
economic forces, an essential feature of the methodology is that it 
must take simultaneous account of the multi - staged product flow s 
involved in the industry. These include the flows of grain and flour 
from farms through to mills and, through storage facilities, via the 
different modes of transport to the eventual delivery points where 
flour is required in New Zealand. Specifically, the methodology 
must be able to analyse the structural changes necessary to deter-
mine the location, number, and size of marketing facilitLes, as well 
as the quantity flows of the industry's products that will minimise 
21. 
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the sum cost of purchase, assembly, storage, processing and dis-
tri:bution of wheat and flour. 
Because of the aggregate nature of the problem, the determina-
tion of appropriate locations for marketing facilities will be a problem 
of selecting among general regions rather than precise localities. 
For example, the problem may be to determine whether milling 
should occ ur at Ashburton; no attempt will be made to dete rmi ne 
where in Ashburton milling should occur. In this way, space can 
be treated as di sc rete regions rathe r than a continuum of fnfi nitel y 
small potential site s. 
By delimiting space to a set of potential locations whe re wheat 
might be produced, milled and finally demanded as flour, it is poss-
ible to represent the basic problem diagrammatically (Fi.gure 3.1). 
FIGURE 3.1 






























Figure 3.1 show s that the fundamential problem is to minimise 
the total assembly, processing and distribution costs of the industry 
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by selecting the rrlost appropriate trade flows of wheat and flour 
between initial source regions and final derrland regions via the rrlost 
appropriate potential rrlill facilitie s. Any cOrrlhination of product 
flows between S(I), F(J) and D(K) are feasible (where 1=1,2, ••• M; 
J=1 , 2, ••• T; K=l, 2, ••• N). Fo r eX;:1rrlple, S(2) could suppl y rrlill 
F(5) with wheat, F(5) in turn could supply DO) and possibly D(4) as 
well. All feasible cOrrlbinations could be represented by arrows in 
a rrlore cOrrlplex flow diagrarrl; different rrlodes of transport could be 
represented in a cOrrlplex diagrarrl, as could t~1.e transhiprrlent of 
wheat via port storage facHitie s. Rathe r than atterrlpting such a 
cOrrlplex diagrarrl, a convenient way of sU1TIrrlarising all the detalls 
of the problerrl in a forrrlalised and consistent rrlanner is to present 
an alge braic staterrlent of the problerrl. 
3.2.1 Algebraic Statement of the Problem 
The problem can be broken into two rrlaior components, the 
objective function and the constraints. 
(1) The Objective FU::1ction 
Minimise TC = II T X + [; Z T X + Z Z T X ij ij ik ik in in k n 
+ I P X + Z P X + Z P X 
j j ij k k ik n in n 
+ Z Z T Z + SY ..L Z Z T Z I 
d jd jd s d nd nd J n 
+ L: L: T Y + Z P Y 
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= Total cost. 
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= amount of wheat transfe r red from i 
= 
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th production region to the j South Island 
mill. 
transport cost of moving each unit of X ..• 
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amount of wheat transferred from the 1 
th production region to the k South Island 
port. 





= amount of wheat transferred directly from 
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the 1 productton region by ra1l to the n 
North Island mill. 
= transport cost and consolidators charges! 
unit of X .• l.a 
p. = f(X) = milling cost pe r tonne of wheat at the 
J th dP j mill. -i < )) ) 
dX. 
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X. = Z X = amount of wheat milled at South Island 
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mill j. 
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amount of wheat delive red and loaded 
at South Island port k. 
th P = h(X ) = pe r unit milling co st at the n No rth 
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Island mill. (_11- < 0). 






y = amount of wheat 
mn 
milled at North Island mill n. 




= L: X k = amount of wheat transported by bulk 
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ship. 
S = q(Y ) = per unit shipping cost of bulk shipping. 
s 








= amount of flour in wheat in wheat equivalents 
th 
transferred from the n North Island mill 
th 
to the d final demand region. 
= transport cost/unit of Znd' 
= amount of wheat transfe r red by co ntaine r 
th 
ship from the k South Island port to the 
nth No rth Island mill. 
= transport cost/unit of Ykn• 
th 
= amount of wheat received at the m 
North Island port. 
P = r(Y ) = per unit storage and unloading cost at 









the m North Island port. d Y sm < 0) • 
th 
= amount of wheat transported from the m 
. th North Island po rt sllo to the n No rth 
Island mill. 
= transport co st/ unit of Y . 
mn 
refers to wheat from farms. 
refe rs to wheat that is transhipped. 
refers to flour shipments. 
f, g, h, q, r are cost functions. 
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It can be seen from equation (1) that the objective function 
seeks to minimise costs. For reasons of simplicity and practicality, 
only measurable costs are included. These are the obvious costs 
arising from the marketing activities of the industry. The costs 
shown as functions in the definitions are decreasing cost functions. 
These model the economies of scale experienced in some marketing 
activities. As such, these effectively make the objective function 
a non-linear lunction. 
It will be recalled from the previous chapter that it is reason-
able to adopt a cost-benefit approach in assessing and analysing 
alte rnative Gove rnment polic y measures. Such an approach seeks 
to minimise costs and maximise benefits. In the objective fu.nction 
of equation (I), benefits are not included. These are not consi.dered 
to be variable, hence it is only sought to minimise costs. 
The overall benefit associated with this problem is assumed to 
be the consumption of flour. Because of the inelastic demand for 
this product this benefit can be incorporated in the model as a con-
straint; that is a fixed targetted amount of product. Although it may 
be naive to assume there is only one benefit arising from the industry's 
activities, certainly this is the primary benefit and purpose of the 
industry and probably the only benefit that can be measured in prac-
tical terms. Other benefits, for ins.tance, the employment a flour 
mill might c reate for a depressed region, can not be easily measured. 
The nature of the objective function with its consideration of 
simplicity and practicality is de signed to guide the model towards 
a restricted, but pragmatic set of solutions which, although unlikely 
to reveal a social optimum, might be able to indicate whether changes 
in the industry's struc ture and conduct could lead to improvements 
in the industr y' s market pe rformance. 
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(ii) The Set of Constraints Minimisation of the objective will 
be undertaken subject to the followi.ng five basLc constraints: 
(a) E 
j 
Z + E jd 
n 
where: 
= FDd for all d (2 ) 
= final demand for flour (measured in w.e. tonnes) 
th in the d region. 
The social objective of supplying consumers with flour can be repre-
sented as a constraint in the problem. Unless solutions to the prob-
lem meet the targetted regional demands for flour they are infeasible 
solutions. The model must ensure that the combined flour transferred 
from South and North Island mills to any demand region must be equal 
to the final demand in that region. 
(b) E X + E X + E X = F S fo r all i (3 ) ij k ik in 1_ n 
where: F S 
1 
= wheat production in region i. 
For solutions to be feasible it is also necessary to reconcile other 
product flows. This constraint ensures that the supply of W;1eat 
received at South Island mills, South Island ports, and that trans-
ferred directly to the North Island from South Island regions, does 
not exceed the quantity of wheat produced in that region. Without 
the upper constraint F S. the model might demand more wheat than 
L 
is available from favoured regions. No lower limit is required since 
it is realistic that the demands for milling grade wheat are less than 
the total amount of wheat produced or available from sources includ-
ing Sydney. 
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Further reconciliation must be made to ensure that production of 
wheat from all regions is at least sufficient to meet the requirements 
for flour tn all demand regions (in w.e. tonnes) and also that the 
amount of wheat available is at least equal to that transferred to mills. 
(d) y ks + y kn for all k 
where Y = the amou::1t loaded to bulk ship at k. 
ks 
(5 ) 
Anothe r reconciliation required to ensure the feasibility of the s0lution 
i.s that wheat ardving at loading ports must equal that loaded to bulk 
and container ships. 
(e) y = L: Y for all n (6 ) 
sm mn 
m 
The amount of wheat loaded to bulk ship from South Island po rts must 
equal that discharged to North Island port storage facilities. In 
addition all product £low s must be greate r than or equal to ze ro: 
X X X X X Xnd' >.. 0 ij' ik' ik' in' jd' - 0 (7 ) 
Basically, the constraints of the problem describe the many 
feasible marketing £lows or industrial structures modelled. Additional 
constraints could be used to modHy the market structure. For 
instance, the amount milled at a ce rtain South Island mill ij could be 
modelled with an upper capacity constraint A; hence 
L: X .. 
1J 
A. 
The actua~, size of the problem, defined in equations (1) - (7), 
will depend on the number of source regions, the number of mills, 
ports, and final demand regions. However, even with a modest 
number of each, the algebraic statement ind':cates that the wheat 
industry problem is complex. 
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Because of the non-linearitie s of the objective function, standard 
linear programming (L.P.) techniques are not suitable to solve the 
problem defined above. The assumption of assumed linear functions 
which is associated with linear programming is valid to study short-
term marginal changes in costs, but is not valid in the longer term 
where long run average costs and economies of scale are to be con-
sidered. Furthermore, the size of the current problem would be 
computationally burdensome if it were formulated as a standard L.P. 
problem. 
One method that does meet the requirements of the wheat industry 
problem is the facility location model. This involves the use of itera-
tive solution procedures in conjunction with heuri.stic rules for solving 
the transhipment prog ramming model. Thi s provide s a methodology 
suitable for analysing long-term structural changes in a system of 
complex marketing flows. Accordingly, this methodology allows the 
complex mul ti - staged product flow s of the industry to be modelled, 
while the iterative solution procedure and heuristic rules allow the 
effects of non-linear costs to be analysed. 
3.3 The Transhipment Problem 
The transhipment model is a modified version of the transpor-
tation model (Higham et aI, 1972; McCarthy et aI, 1972 and Borrell, 
1980). By allowing transhipment points or intermediate destinations 
of a multi-stage distribution problem to be modelled first as demand 
points (destinations) and secondly as supply points (sources) it is 
possible to view a transhipment problem as a set of simultaneous 
transportatio'J. problems. In this form the transhipment model can 
3 
be solved using a transportation algorithm. This determines the 
optimal flow s of a homoge nous product from a numbe r of suppl y 
3 




origins to a number of demand de stinatlons. Optimisation will be 
undertaken subject to the availability of set supplies and set require-
ments of demand in the regions considered, and given constant 
transport costs. 
1£ all possible product flows of the problem defined in the alge-
braic statement of section 3 .Z.1 are viewed as i~nvolving the tra'1.S-
portation of a product between several sets of sources and destinations, 
then thi s problem can be repre sented schematicall y as tn Table 3. 1. 
In Table 3. 1 all feasible product flow s between source sand 
destinations can occur at the penalty of a transportation cost. These 
co sts are repre sented by the IC I sub- matrice s of Table 3.1. From 
the positioning of the IC I sub-matrices it can be seen that at the first 
marketing stage wheat can be transfe rred from initial supply regions 
(Sl, SZ "" S6), to South Island Mills (Ml, MZ, "', MS), South 
Island Ports PI, PZ, "', P4), or directly to North Island mills by 
rail (NMI, NMZ, ... , NM4). Wheat can al so be transfe r red to the 
dummy demand (DD). It is necessary to include a dummy demand 
to absorb any surplus supply from the so.urce region. Supply must 
exactly equal demand if the transpor':3.tion algorithm is to be used 
to solve the transhipment problem. Surplus supply allocated to this 
point at ze ro cost allow s the problem to be balanced without affecting 
the minimum cost solution. The supply available at anyone source 
is given by the Si value. 
Infeasible product flow s of Table 3. I are modelled by placing 
an infinitely high penalty cost between source and destination. In 
Table 3.1 these occur where there are II co II sub-matrices. The 
solution procedure will always avoid shipme'1.ts along routes involv-
ing prohibitively high cost. 
4 Optimal here means minimum transport costs. 
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The wheat allocated to primary demand ~')oints can be traced 
through the remaining feasible product flow s of Table 3.1 and be 
seen to eventuall y and up at the final demand regions. The wheat 
transferred to South Island mills is further transferred, after mill-
ing, as flour (measured :n wheat equivalents) to final d:=mand regions 
(FDl, FD2, "', FD13). The amounts demanded by these individual 
regions are given by the fd. value s whic hare the known cons umption 
1 
level in each region. Again transport costs will be incurred as the 
product is transferred to final demands. No cost is incurred if 
South Island mills supply themselves; this allows the mill to be 
modelled with surplus capacity. 
The diagonal line s of Table 3.1 indicate whe re transhipme nt 
points can supply to themselves at zero cost. Hence it can be seen 
that the Ml South Island mill can supply to itself as a destination. 
The infinitely high costs \:n the off diagonals prevent transfers to 
othe r mill s. 
In effect by allowing a mill to s '.:rpply to itself at zero cost a 
second form of dummy demand is created. With a dllmmy demand 
to absorb surplus milling capacity (without affecting the total cost 
of the minimum cost solution) it is possible to model South Island 
mills as having an unrestricted supply of milling capacity. This is 
given by the arbLtrary large value A. In this way the cost minimis-
ing solution procedure is unrestricted in the amount it allocates to 
any mill. Hence it is possible to determine the optimal amount of 
wheat to be milled at anyone mill location. 
Of the remaining flow s in Table 3.1, South Island ports can 
supply either bulk ship, or North Island mills by container; bulk 
ships can supply North Island ports, North Island ports can in turn 
supply North Island mills, and these in b.rn can supply final d,emand 
regions. It is not difficult to see that imports of Australian wheat 
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could also be allowed for in the model. Taese could be included by 
specifying sa y, Sydney a s a port supplying to bulk ship. This would 
require another port, P6, to supply to bulk ship, S. The amount 
loaded a t Sydney could then be constrained at any level between zero 
and A and any surplus Sydney wheat could supply to the dummy demand, 
DD, at zero cost. 
Al though Table 3.1 repre sents all feasible transport flow s of 
the wheat and flour industry, it does not represent the full tranship-
ment problem of the industry. A solution to the current model would 
assume transport flows to be independent of the efficiency of process-
ing or handling wheat at various transhipment points. Clearly this 
would be :naive. 
It is possible to include processing and handling costs at tranship-
ment points in the model. This modification makes it possible to study 
the effects of processing and handling costs on the location of processing 
fa c ili ti e s • 
Processing and handling costs are included in the transhipment 
model simply by adding these costs to the transport costs of sub-
matrice s of type IC I in Table 3.1 For example, to include the cost 
of South Island milling, MC, it is simply a matter of addi.ng the per 
unit milling cost mc, (in the algebraic statement defined as f.) to 
J ) 
the transport cost c,' (in the algebraic statement defined as t,,) in 
1J 1J 
the north-west sub-matrix of Table 3.1 It should be noticed that 
mc, is a constant (linear) cost rather than a non-linear function 
J 
depicting the decreasing costs associated with economies of scale 
in milling. The transhipment model itself Can not take account of 
non-linear costs. The implication arising from this will be examined 
later when it will be shown how the affects of non-linear costs can 
be analysed using iterative solution procedures and heuristLc search 
techniques (see Section 3.4). 
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Other features of the transhipment model make it possLble to 
examine a number of spatial problems which may be associated with 
an industry. For Lnstance, it should be noted that capacitated prob-
lems can be formuJ.ated in the transhipment framework (Hurt and 
Tramel, 1965). That is, it is possible to place any desired upper 
demand or supply constraint on processing or transhipment facilities 
of the model. In the wheat industry problem this would make it poss-
ible to represent mi11i:ng quotas. Similarly, it would be possible to 
restrict bulk shipping to at least its current 100, 000 tonne volume. 
Leath and Martin (1966) show how it is also possible to place lower 
bound capacity constrai nts on p roce s sing 0 r transhipme nt facilitie s. 
Using upper and lower bound constraints, the existing political 
constraints of the market can be represented and, in fact, the entire 
market structure of the existing industry can be simulated. It would 
then be possible to compare the solutions of the capacitated model to 
those arising when constraints are absent, that is, in the uncapa'citated 
case. 
The solution to the transhipment model showing optimal product 
flows through facilities and between regions is known as the primal 
solution. Associated with every linear programming problem there 
is also a dual solution. In solving the primal L.P. problem, the 
dual L. P. formulation is automatically solved. The optimal values 
of dual variables show how the objective function would change with 
a unit change in constraints of the problem. Hence, as CaSSidy 
(1968, p. 57) points out, the dual solution allows the marginal value 
of additional capacity for constrained activities to be estimated. For 
example, it would be possible to estimate the value of increasing the 
milling quota at a Wellington mill by one tonne of wheat. This may 
be useful information to gauge the marginal opportunity cost which 
current political constraints impose on the industry. Furthermore, 
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from the dual solution of the problem it would be pos sible to e stima te 
the price differentials between regions. This may be helpful infor-
mation for it would show the amount by which wheat and flour prices 
should vary between regions, that is, it would determine the relative 
marginal values of wheat and flour grown in, or delivered to different 
regions. It will be recalled from chapter 3 that in the current market 
standardi sed whea t and flour price s are paid throughput New Zealand, 
and therefore regional price differentials are totally unknown. 
Provided product homogeneity is assumed, transhipment formu-
lations are flexible enough to handle a wide range of problems. These 
include multi-region, multi-plant, multi-stages and even multi-period 
(Leath and Martin, 1967) programming problems. It should be noted 
that the homogeneity assumption does not prevent multi-product 
problems from being formulated in this framework as different products 
can be expressed in equivalent terms. For the current problem, flour 
is expressed in whea t equivalents. Since one tonne of wheat produces 
.78 tonnes of flour, a wheat equivalent tonne of flour is accordingly, 
.78 of a tonne. 
In summary, it can be seen that the solution to the transhipment 
problem can be used to yield a grea t deal of information useful in 
polic y analysis. Primarily, the solution will determine optimal product 
flows among regions. From such a solution it wilrbe possible to' 
determine the efficient pattern of mill and port usage. Regional 
price differentials 'can· also be obtained and, in the capacitated 
case, the opportunity cost of milling quotas and transport constraints 
could be determined. However, the product flows will only be opti-
mal in a restricted sense, that is assuming all costs are linear. 
Clearly, with economies of scale in milling, shipping and ship load-
ing and unloading, this is unrealistic. Iterative solution procedures 
used in conjunction with heuri.stic search rules allow this problem 
to be overcome. 
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3.4 He rative Sol utio n Procedure s and Heuristic Search Technique s 
The effect of non-linear costs can be analysed in the linear 
transhipment model by repeatedly solving the linear problem. This 
can be done by updating the per unit processing costs to reflect the 
economy of scale that would be achieved given the prescribed through-
puts of facilities in the previous solution. Combined with the heuristic 
procedures of Logan and King (1964), Stammer (1971) or Higham et al 
(1972) which either encourage, discourage or force processing facili-
ties into or, out of, the model, the solution procedure iterates towards 
an eventual stable solution. 
The solution will indicate the location, number and size of pro-
cessing (transhipment) facilities which exploit the economies of scale 
in processing, as well as determining an efficient pattern of transpor-
tation for the industry's products. Because the heuristic rules do 
not provi.de optimising criteria for selecting among potential facilities, 
the method does not ensure a global optimum solution. It can only 
5 
ensure a local optimum solution. U suall y many local optima may 
exist, several of which may be of interest to the policy maker. 
The heuristic rules of Logan and King (1964) and Stammer (971) 
provid,::; a fixed criteria that can be used to derive a certain local 
optimum. The Logan and King method eliminate s potential facilitie s 
if they appear in any solution with zero throughput. These are dropped 
from further consideration by placing artificially high costs on the use 
of the facilities. By contrast the Stammer method allows previously 
excluded facilities to remain at their previous costs so they will not 
be excluded from further re-evaluations. However, if only allocated 
a small quantity as a result of re-evaluation, the per unit cost will 
5 
A local optimum solution is one that has a lower total cost than 
would ari se from alte rnative market structure s created by making 
only small changes to the solution. With large changes, economies 
of scale may be achieved at other facilities. This could result in 
other local optima solutions. A solution is a global optimum if no 
alternative solution has a lower total cost. 
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usually rise in successive iterations as the full scale effects wouJ.d 
llOt be realised. This is likely to eliminate the facility from further 
consideration. Both these methods passively seek out one local 
optimum according t<;> predetermined beuristic rules. Only the forc-
ing procedure of Higham et al gives the researcher the option to 
actively encourage locations into, or force locations out of, the solution. 
This can be done by either adjusting the unit processing cost or by 
adjusting the capacity constraints on facilities. In this way the 
researcher is equipped to actively explore the solution space of the 
problem. The forcing procedlue enables the researcher to seek 
out alte rnative local optimum solutions. This allow s the re searche r 
to apply other heuristic criteria such as that suggested by Rogers 
0978, p. 16-27): 
"if there are two locations present in a stable solution 
which are 'geographically close', one of them is a good 
candidate for 'forcing out'." 
It also enables the researcher the abllity to seek solutions possess-
ing particular qualitative attribtltes that may be of interest for policy 
purpose s. The pos sibility of being able to locate seve ral low co st 
solutions may be particularly helpful. 
Although iterative solution procedures and heuristic search 
techniques help overcome the problems introduced by non-linear 
costs, a further difficulty is presented. Because of the presence of 
non-linear costs, and therefore the possibility of several local optima, 
it is possible that the marginal values given by the d'.lal solution may 
be difficult to interpret as there will not be a unique set of d'.lal costs. 
Where all intermediate d'emand and supply points are uncapacitated, 
their marginal values will be zero in the dual solution regardless 
of whether non-linear costs are tnc1uded in the objective function. 
However, when non-linear costs are included, an alternative optimum 
may indicate that inc reasing throughput at a certain mill would result 
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in substantial reductions in total costs. Therefore, while a marginal 
change would not crea te cos t savings, large change s may do. In thi s 
way, dual costs can not be used to gauge how further changes in mar-
ket structure may lead to cost savings. 
The relative marginal values of wheat and flour at initial supply 
and final demand regions will be available from the dual solution 
attained from problems with non-linear costs. These values, however, 
will not be unique. An alterna tive local optimum solution and there-
fore alterna tive market structure with a similar total cost could produce 
quite different sets of regional price differentials. This may have 
important implications if the model was used to suggest what might 
be fair relative prices for different regions. 
3.5 Summary and Co nc1usions 
It has been shown in this chapter how the transhipment model 
can be used to study multi-region, multi-staged marketing problems. 
Further, it has been shown how the use of Hera tive solution technique s 
which embody heuristic search procedures could be used in conjunc-
tion with the transhipment model to study the effects of economies of 
scale on multi-region, multi-staged marketing problems. It is 
precisely these types of problems that exist in the wheat and flour 
industry. 
In the next chapter a prac tical sta tic model of the industry 
is set up. In chapter 5 results arising from using this model with 
heuristic search procedures are reported. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE MODEL -
THE PROGRAMMING MATRIX, DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS 
4. I Introduction 
This chapter sets up the program.m.ing m.atrix d:scussed in the 
previous chapter. This requires defining the regions of the m.odel 
and specifying relevant regional dem.ands and supplies, and m.illing 
and shipping capacities. In addition, transport charges for wheat 
and flour shipm.ents and proces sing and handling co sts m.ust be 
specified. 
4.2 Regional Dem.arcations 
New Zealand was partiti.oned i.nto various regions for the study. 
Regional boundaries were established according to the areas distin-
guished by the existing transportation patterns, however, subjective 
considerations and the availability of data also had a bearing of 
where these were fixed. 
For initial wheat supply from. farm.s, the South Island regions 
presented in the North-West corner of Table 4.1 were used to define 
the six production regions for the m.odel. Countie s we re aggregated 
into these six general regions partly for statistical convenience, but 
m.ostly because of their distances from. initial destinations to which 
wheat is transported. 
The location of flour m.i.lls in the m.odel were assum.ed to be 
the general regions in which m.ills are currently located; dispatch 
ports were defined by existing ports and receival ports by their 
proxim.ity to North Island m.ills. Final dem.and regions were 
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considered to corre spond to the regional popula tion densities, and, 
a s such conveniently corre sponded with the sta tis tical area s used by 
the New Zealand Department of Sta tistic s (1973). However, because 
within the Wellington, Canterbury and Otago regions there are more 
than one supply region, aggregation of these as final demand regions 
would conceal certain possible trade flows in the model. Accordingly, 
• 
Wellington WaS di saggrega ted into Palmer s ton North and Wellington; 
Canterbury was disaggregated according to the flour demands around 
Timaru, Ashburton and Christchurch; and Otago was separated into 
Oamaru and remaining Otago. Further, it was considered appropria te 
to aggregate North Auckland and Auckland, East Coast and Hawkes 
Bay, Nelson and Marlborough, and Christchurch and Westland, since 
it was expected that the combined regions would be supplied from the 
same sources. Hence, in all there are thirteen demand regions. 
These can be seen as final demand regions ·presented in the North-
West corne r of Table 4.1 
4.3 QsJ;a 
Four ·general types of data were required for the model; 
(i) regional supplies of whea t, 
(ii) regional demands for flour, 
(iii) milling and shipping capacities (for the capacitated 
problem), and 
(iv) regional and inter-regional transport, processing 
and handling costs. 
4.3.1. Regional Supplies 
All regional supplies were as sumed inela stic • The amounts 
a.ssigned were considered to be fairly representative of a year of 
self-sufficiency. and were estimated as follows: 
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tonne s 
1. Southland 76,000 
2. Otago (excluding North Otago) 23,000 
3. North Otago 16,000 
4. South Canterbury 50,000 
5. Mid Canterbur y 75,000 
6. Remaining Canterbur y 50,000 
It was assumed that the regional supply quantities are of mill-
ing quali ty whea t. 
4.3.2 Regional Final Demands 
Like the regional supplies, regional demands were assumed to be 
inelastic. Estimates of final demands were calculated fl-um-the 
national average flour consumption of 70 kilograms per head (N. Z. 
Department of Statistics, 1979a). Assuming £lour use to be evenly 
dispersed among the population, the population multiplied by this 
average WaS considered to give a reasonable approximation of demand 
in each area. These final demands for £lour were converted to wheat 
equivalents; these are as follows: 
Auckland/North Auckland 
South Ba y of Plenty 
Ea st Coast/Hawkes Ba y 
Taranaki 
Palmer ston North 
Wellington 
Nel son/Marlborough 
Christchurch and Districts/Westland 















Otago (South and Central) 
Southland 






Milling capaci tie s used for the fir st run of the model we re those 
corre sponding to exi sting regional quota capacitie s. Borrell (1980, 




Timaru to Temuka 
Ashburton 
Christchurch and Rangiora 
Wellington 
Palmers ton North 














The shipping capacity constraint corresponded to the current restric-
tions which limit bulk shipping to 100,000 tonnes per annum from the 
South Island to the North, but the se were required in capacita ted 
versions of the model only. 
4.3.4 Marketing Cos ts 
Although estimates of costs for the model were drawn from a 
variety of sources and time periods, appropriate adjustments were 
made to standardise costs to those applicable as at May 1979. These 
costs fall into general categories as outlined overleaf. 
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(i) TransDort Costs The constant per unit transport costs 
between sources and destinations can be seen in Table 4.1. The sub-
matrices of the parent matrix designated with a letter A, B, C, etc) 
define where feasible product flows of the model can occur. 
Table 4.1 is similar to Table 3.1 of the previous chapter. The 
distinguishing fea ture between these two table s is simpl y tha t in the 
latter, actual, rather than theoretical regions have been specified, 
and the list of source regions have been re-ordered. 
The costs applicable to matrice s A and B of Table 4.1 are the 
Ministry of Transport Area Road Schedule Charges (1979), and the 
New Zealand Government Railways Class E Rail Rates (1979). Where 
the inter-regional transfer s in ma trice s A and B involve dis tance s 
in excess of 150 kilometres, rail rates have been calculated. This 
has been under-taken to represent Government's 150 kilometre road 
transport limit. In addi tio n to the rail co s t, a consolida tor's fee ha s 
been included for the service involved in loading rail wagons. 
To calculate intra-regional transfer costs of matrices A and B 
it would have been necessary to calculate an average distance between 
sources and destinations of each area. Since the New Zealand Wheat 
Board must calculate this distance to determine the receipts of growers 
from the Ministry of Transport area road schedules and Class E rail 
rate s, it was pos sible to compute a weighted ave rage cost from a 
,-
sampling of the Wheat Board's source documents which detailed this 
information. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show respectively- matri.ces A and 
B. The co sts in Table s 4.2 and 4.3 are conside red to be the be st 
available estimates of the costs of the transport activities represented 
in these tables. The same data sources have been used to derive 
representative transfer costs involved in railing wheat to North 
Island mills from South Island supply regions. These costs comprise 
mainly Class E rail rates, but also include £ann to rail transport 
TABLE 4.2 
Ayerage Transport Cost from Farms to South Island Mills 
Used in Matrix A of Table 4.1 
($/tonne whea t) 
~ Timaru Southland Dunedin Oamaru and Ashburton Farms Temuka 
Southland 5 18 25 29 32 
Otago 18 10 20 24 27 
North Otago 25 15 2 6 15 
South Canterbury 29 19 6 4 5 
Mid Canterbury 32 22 15 5 2 














Ayerage Transport Costs from Farms to South Island Ports 
Used jn Matrix B of Table 4.1 
($/tonne whea t) 
~ Bluff Dunedin Timaru Lyttelton Farms Bulkship Container Bulk Bulk 
Southland 10 20 29 38 
Otago 20 13 24 33 
North Otago 27 17 6 21 . 
South Ca nterbury 31 21 3 1 7 
Mid Canterbur y 34 24 5 14 














Railage from South Island Farms to North Island Mills 
Used in Matrix C of Table 4.1 
($/tonne wheat) 
~rtb 
S th Island Wellington Palmerston Mount ~~land ~~ North Maunganui 
Farms 
Southland 62 70 88 
Otago 55 64 81 
North Otago 50 59 76 
South 
Canterbury 46 55 72 
Mid Canterbury 43 52 69 
Remaining 
Canterbury 39 48 66 
TABLE 4.5 
Costs of Transporting Whea t to North Island bv 
Co ntainer Ship a 
U sed in Ma trix E of Ta ble 4.1 
($/tonne whea t) 
~ I I South Island Palmerston Mount Island ills Wellington North Maunganui Ports 
Dunedin Ro/Ro 50 60 75 














a It was considered infeasible for other South Island ports to supply 
directly to North Island ports by container ship. 
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the apportioning of fLxed costs. The fuel cost associated with ship-
ping along any of the nine routes can be treated as a linear cost. 
These can be [ncluded tn matrLx F of Table 4.1. 
Estimate s showed that pe r unit fuel cost along any of the nine 
routes did not differ by more than one dollar. These costs were 
ve ry low and are equal to approx£mately $1.00 per tonne of wheat. 
The se we re included in the model through matrix F of Table 4.1. 
Matrix G of Table 4.1 compr£ses area road schedule or Class E 
rail rates for permissable transport flows from North Island ports 
to North Island mills. Table 4.6 reports these costs. 
The transport cost matrices A - G represent the costs of 
as sembling wheat to mill s. The remaining two matrice s of Table 
4.1 repre sent the delive r y costs of flour from mill s. 
Rail costs are also applicable for the transport of flour from 
South Island mills to North Isla'1d and also outpost South Island final 
demand areas. Flour moving in bulk containe rs is railed at 1.25 
time s Clas s E rail rate s. In compa ri. so n, bagged flour railed by 
freight forwarders under contract is railed at rates slightly less 
than Class E rates. However, extra costs are included in deliver-
ing bagged flour since flour often must be bulked to facilitate 
delivery. For this reason, it is reasonable to use the 1.25 times 
Class E rates to estimate all flour railage costs. Although con-
solidato rs I fee s for loading and unloading we re not obtained for the 
study, an arbitrary 7 per cent of the Class E rate (5 per cent for 
loading, 2 per cent unloading) was included to at least take account 
of this cost. Therefore 1.32 times Class E rates were used to 
estimate flour railage plus handling costs. Howeve r, because flour 
is expressed as wheat equivalents in the model, the true quantity 
of flour required by any final d,3stination will be 078 that of the 
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solution. Therefore, it is necessary to calculate a 22 per cent dis-
count on the appropriate rate, whLch equals 1.03 Umes Class E rates. 
Table 4.7 shows the costs used in matrix H of Table 4.1. 
The zero costs of Table 4.7 correspond 'so intra- regional delivery 
costs of flour. No attempt was made to quantify these. Similarly, 
no intra - region flour d,::live ry cost is levi-=d on inte r- regional flour 
transfers, only a cost for the inter-regional leg of the journey is 
charged. 
The remaining matrlx of Table 4.1 is matrix I which repre sents 
the delivery costs of flour from North Island mills to final demand 
regions. In this matrix, 1.03 times Class E rail rates or area 
road schedule rates have been used to estimate transport costs to 
North Island final demand areas. Transfers from North Island mills 
to South Island final demand regions in matrix J were assumed 'Co be 
feasible. 
Other marketing costs are also required for the model. These 
relate to the cost functions associated with processing or hand~ing 
at transhipme nt points. 
(if) Milling Costs Stati stical (econometric) anal ysi s of accou:1t-
ing data was made to establish the nature of the economies of scale 
experienced ~n New Zealand milling. Although it can be expected 
that many factors such as location, age of plant, specialisation and 
;?roduct differentiation, depreciation and other accounting procedares 
distort the obse rved scale effects in milling, it is possible to fit a 
representative function that will show the general relationship 
between cost of milling and mill size. This could be estimated from 
accounting data measuring the actual cost of milling for a variety of 
diffe rent sized mills. Howeve r, econometric estimation would sugge st 
careful consideration must also be given to any a priori expectations 
~ en"lands Southla nd Otago Mills 
Invercargill 0 19 
Dunedin 19 0 
Oamaru 26 12 
Tiluaru and 
Temuka 30 16 
Ashburton 33 19 
Christchurch 
and Rangiora 37 23 





North Island Port to Mill 'I'.ra.rulport Costs 
.!1~d in Matrjx G of Thble 4.1 
($/tonne of wheat equivalent) 
-
Palmerston Mount Wellington North Maunganui 
2 12 35 
35 20 1 
35 30 10 
TABLE 4.7 
~ort Costs fmm SQuthl§lapd Mills to Final Demand Re~iQn~ 
Used in Matrix H of Table-Ll 
($/wheat equivalent tonne flour) 
North South Mid Remaining Other 
Otago Canterbury Canterbury Canterbury South Wellington Palmers ton Island North 
26 30 33 37 50 63 72 
12 16 19 23 39 56 66 
0 6 1 5 20 34 51 61 
6 0 5 15 30 47 57 
15 5 0 13 27 44 53 











































North Island Mill to Final Demand Tr..a..nsport Costs 
Used in Matrix I of Table 4.1 




Nort Palmerston Coast 
Demand Wellington Taranaki Islan North Hawkes 
Mills egions Bay 
Wellington 0 12 17 27 
Palmerston North 12 0 20 1 7 
Mount Maunganui 35 30 18 20 

















which may have been established about the production process, and 
the curve fitted to the data should be consistent with these expectations. 
For instance, French (1977) notes that milling operations wbich 
involve large capital inputs relative to labour inputs are likely to 
show greate r economie s of scale; this is the case with flour milling. 
Other a priori expectations relevant to flour milling may be estab-
lis ned from similar stud£e s undertaken elsewhe re. Leath and Blakel y 
(1972, p. 23) report that some flour mills Cn the United State shave 
an annual output of 600, 000 tonnes of flour. This is equivalent to 
three time s the req uireme nts of the New Zealand population. Thi s 
might suggest there is no upper limit or internal d:seconomy of 
scale applicable to the New Zealand milling operation, although the 
combined cost of milling and other activities certainly may create 
net di seconomie s. 
A common functional fonn used to represent decreasing cost 
functions which do not have an upper limit, is: 
where 
(3 
Y = a X 
Y = processing cost per 
a = positive constant 
(3 = negative powe r 
U'1.it 
X = quantity of product processed. 
(1) 
The function form above was used. to estimate the milling cost 
curve in this study. From point estimates obtained:n discussion 
with flour millers and using the average marketing margin paid for 
flour at I February 1978 (adjusted to 1979 prices) established by 
the Department of Trade and Industries (1978) (see Append~x I) 
a set of synthetic data was derived. This was used to obtain a 
crude estimate of a representative long run average cost curve 
(scale curve) for milling. This is reported in equation (2). 
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M C = 275 X - • 2 5497 
where MC = milling cost per tonne of wheat 
X = quantity of wheat mi1led. 
Equation (2) was estimated in logarithmic form using ordinary 
least squares. Because synthetic data were used, the usual statist-
ical tests are not valid. 
Although the estimation of this function lacked the statistical 
rigour required in econometric estimation, at the time, the limita-
tions of the data meant it was the best estimate that could ";)e made. 
Equation (2) was used to represent milling costs in the model. 
Subsequent to completing the analysis of the project, data were 
received from the New Zealand Flour Millers As sociation (1979). 
However, the time avai1able did not make it possible to test how 
sensitive solutions were to the new function estimated using these 
6 
data. 
The nature of pe r unit milling co sts repre sented by eql~ation (2) 
can be seen in Figure 4.1. 
6 Using these data a similar equation to (2) was estimated: 
MC = 145X-·18578 
-2 
R =.89 
Both parameters CJ. = 145, and S = -.18578 were highly 
significant. This relationship provided an estimate of 
milling cost which was approximately 3 pe r cent higher 
than of equation (2), at a milling capacity of 15,000 tonnes. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
Shape of Reure senta tive Scale Cllrve for Milling 
$ 
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Wheat 
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It can be seen from Figure 4.1 that for a mill with a throllgh-
pllt of 5,000 tonne s of wheat per annllm, it wo uld be expec ted to incur 
a per tonne milling cost of approximately $31.00. This compares to 
a co s t of approxima tel y $16.00 pe r tonne of whea t for a mill wi th a 
capacity of 70,000 tonnes of wheat per annum. 
Equation (2) was used to estimate milling costs in both the 
capacitated and uncapacitated versions of the model. In the capaci-
tated ca se where existing mill numbers, sizes and loca tions were 
assumed to apply, equation (2) WaS llsed to obtain a per unit milling 
cost for each mill size in each region. A weighted average cost 
WaS then calculated from these to estimate an appropriate milling 
co st for each region of the model. The se were then trea ted as 
constant costs in the model. This contrasts with the use of the 
cost function in the uncapacitated version of the model. There 
tl).e per unit milling cost was able to vary as discussed in section 
3.4 of Chapter 3. 
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The major limitation to using detaiJed obse rvations from exi st-
ing lnills to obtain a representative cost function, is the danger of 
generalising from such a curve. For instance, the political restric-
tions constraining pos si:.ble rationalisation of the New Zealand flour 
milling industry may have prevented1.ew, more productive milling 
equLpment from being adopted in this cou;1.try. Therefore, to extra-
polate costs for a future rationalised industry based on what has 
occurred in the past may be invalLd. Nevertheless, despite this 
limitation and de spite the limitatio;1. introduced by the c rude data 
used, equation (2) at least allow s the model to acknowledge the 
presence of economies of scale in milling and their effects on the 
market structure of the industry. If these are significant, it will 
indicate the value of establishing a more accurate milling cost curve. 
(iii) Port Storage a;1.d Handling Costs To estimate port storage 
and handling costs a combination of enginee ring and accounting data 
we re used. The :1977 amo rti sed construction co sts of the Timaru 
port silos combined with current wharfage and handling costs for 
South Island ports provided the base from which a non-linear function 
of the fo rm: 
where 
PtC = 2.. +.Q / Y was calculated, 
= constant wharfage, segregation and 
cleaning costs, 
.Q = fixed cost of amortised inflation 
ad iusted capital, inte re st and fixed 
annual operating cost, including rent, 
Y = throughput of wheat, 
PtC = port costs per tonne of wheat hand:':.ed. 
($ /tonne). 
Source: Pri_vate Transpo rt Company, 197 9b) 
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The same 2:. and .Q coefficients we re used to compute the costs 
for each South Island port and the coefficients were calculated aSSUln-
ing 6,000 tonnes of storage at each locality. The estimated coefficients 
are: 
a = 4, 
and b = 140, 000. 
For Timaru, which has a current annual throughput of 36, 000 tonnes, 
the equation would sugge st port co sts equivalent to approximatel y 
eight dollars per tonne would be incurred. This appears a good 
approximation of the costs of wharfage, handling, and other small 
incidental charges applying for 1979 at Timaru. 
The 2:. and .Q coefficients used to represent costs of unloading 
and handling through a facility with 6,000 tonnes storage capacity at 
Mount Maunganui made allowance for highe r amortised capital costs 
in the.Q cost component of the equation, but allowed a lower 2:. cost 
component tha n fo r South Island ports. Higher amo rti sed capital 
co sts we re as sumed due to the need for unloading gea r. Thi s was 
conside red to be mo re expensive than loading gear of South Island 
",?orts. The lower 2:. cost represented cheaper wharfage rates as 
i.ndicated in the New Zealand Stevedoring Statistics and also no cost 
of segregation or cleaning was anticipated. In this situation the 
coefficients used were: 
a = 1 
b = 200, 000. 
Because there is currently no facility at Mount Maunganui, this equa-
tion could not be validated, but must be assulned to be representative 
of such a facility. 
Cost of port storage facilities at Auckland and Wellington were 
also required in the model. Here engineering data were used. 
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The. informa tion wa s a ttained from an Auckland company which 
had contracted engineers to research the possibility of establishing 
a silo complex a t one of Auckland r s wharve s (Private Transport 
Company, 1979b). This information revealed that construction costs 
would be expensive due to piling problems a s socia ted with the proposed 
site. In addition, the demand for port sites in Auckland made rental 
costs expensive, suggesting more expensive vertical rather than 
horizontal type silos would be required. From this information, it 
was calculated that a fixed annual cost of approximately one million 
dollars would be incurred in opera ting a receival port storage at 
Auckland. In addition, a constant stevedoring charge of one dollar 
per tonne was assumed. Although alternative sites were considered, 
the Auckland study concluded these would have been located bo far 
from the existing flour mills, and therefore, more expensive road 
transport would be involved. The model used here doe s not contain 
specific mill locations within each generallocalityr •. Because the 
Auckland study abandoned the possibility of alternative sites within 
Auckland itself, the potential savings of such sites cannot have been 
grea t if they would not more than compensa te for additional transport 
charges from more remote sites. Therefore, it might be concluded 
that siting a port storage and unloading facility at Auckland might be 
expensive regardless of its specific site. 
No information is available on the potential costs of storage 
at Wellington. Therefore, it WaS assumed a fixed cost somewhere 
between the costs at Mount Maunganui and that at Auckland would 
be appropriate. Since the expensive piling costs were a problem 
peculiar to Auckland, it Was assumed these would not be applicable 
at Wellington. However, as a main shipping centre, it WaS con-
sidered that demand for port sites would crea te higher rental and 
Harbour Board leases than at Mount Maunganui. In light of these 
considerations, it was anticipated that a fixed annual cost of approx-
ima tely half a million dollar s would be .repre sentatLve nr the costs 
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incurred in the receival port storage facility at Wellington. It was 
eXDected that wha rfao-e of one dollar pe r tonne would al so be inc ur red. t ~ 
All per unit port storage and handling costs have been cal-
culated assuming a fixed sized facility of 6,000 tonnes storage 
capacity. Although the throughput is allowed to vary, the fact that 
the facilityls capacity is not, means the port cost functions are not 
strictly long run average cost curves. They are, however, scale 
curves that experience decreasing per unit costs as throughput 
increases. Further, the 6,000 tonne storage capacity is assumed 
not to constrain this throughput. This assumption is considered 
reasonable, for even if anyone port was shown in the solution to 
handle 150,000 tonnes of wheat per annum, this would mean the 
6,000 tonne storage facility would need to turnover its whea t stocks 
each fortnight (i.e. 150,000/6,000 = 25, and 25 x 2 weeks:: 1 year). 
With efficient shipping, loading and unloading operations as allowed 
for in the model, thi s would seem to be practical. 
The greatest limitation of the port storage and handling cost 
equations relate to the adequacy of the data. It has been necessary 
to estimate port storage and handling costs by making several 
ra ther arbi trary as sumptions. The se could very likely be incorrect 
and the costs, especially at Mount Maunganui and Wellington, could 
be quite different to those used here. 
(iv) Shipping Cos ts Large fixed co sts and only minor va ri-
able costs characterise the economies of bulk shipping. Engineering 
da ta. obtained from the Shipping Corpora tion of New Zeala nd, the 
Ministry of Transport and two priva te transport companies all con-
firmed this fact. It was these data. that was used to establish the 
annual fixed costs of operating a bulk vessel capable of shipping all 
the North Island requirements of wheat from either the South Island 
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or Australia. Tnis was assumed to be a completely New Zealand 
operation using a specialised ship not designed for competition for 
other bulk car goe s on the world marke t, or in New Zealand. Tne se 
costs are presented in Appendix 2. Fuel costs of shipping are 
incorporated in the model through matrix H. Tnerefore, the cost 
curve for shipping is formulated as: 
where 
SC = 0./ Z 
a. = fixed cos t, 
Z = quantity of wheat shipped, (tonnes) 
SC = per tonne shipping cos t. ($/ tonne) 
For a 6,000 tonne bulk ship the annual fixed cost was assumed 
equal to three million dollar s, that is a. = $3 m (see Appendix 2). 
Based on the current volume of wheat transported by bulk ship, the 
shipping cost would equal $30.00 per ton:1.e. Combined with wharf-
age and handling costs, this is a reasonable estimate of e'xisting (:osts. 
As with the calcula tions made for port storage and handling 
costs, the computed shipping cost equation assumes a fixed capacity 
of 6,000 tonnes. However, because the marginal cost of building 
larger bulk carriers is only small, it is unlikely tha t if a different 
sized ship was required that this would substantially affect per unit 
shipping costs. Only if a larger ship with spare capacity could be 
used to transport alternative cargoes could the per unit average 
cost of shipping be lowered. In Appendix 2 it Can be seen that even 
if a 6,000 tonne bulk ship was required to ship 200,000 tonnes of 
whea t to the North Island from Sydney each yea r, there would still 
be spare days a vaila ble (i. e. when the ship would not be used). 
Hence it would appear that a 6,000 tonne vessel places no upper 
level of the economtes of scale in shipping. 
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4.4 Smumary and Concllg;ions 
In this chapter the programming matrix of the model has been 
defined, the data required for the model presented, and some prob-
lems of the model and its assumptions were discussed. Attention 
must be drawn to the limitations of some of the data used; in par-
ticular' the crude estimate required to be made for the milling 
cost curve and the arbitrary assumptions made to calculate scale 
curves for two North Island ports. Nevertheless, these estimates 
allow the theoretical problems identified in chapter two to be 
embodied in a practical model. Although better estimates for some 
scale curves would engender greater confidence in the model, the 
actual estimates made in this chapter do, at least, allow a complete, 
if not refined, model to be built. The be nefit of a complete model 
is that it allows a representation of the economic forces of the wheat 
and flour industry, and the effects of the se fa rce s on the market 
structure of the industry can be studied and analysed in a simultaneous 
and consistent manner. The results of the model simulations which 
are presented in the next chapter provi:de an indi:cation of the changes 





This chapter presents and discusses the results obtained from 
experiments conducted using the model developed in the previous 
chapter. Tne se re sul ts were obtained from seve ral succe s sive 
runs of the model in which current policy restrictions were relaxed 
until the model remained constrained only by final demand and ini tial 
supply. Heuristic search procedures were applied to investigate 
the solution space in an effort to discover several low cost uncon-
strained solutions. 
5.2 First Re sults - The Capacita. ted Problem 
As the starting point of the analysis, the model was run assum-
ing that the existing set of milling quotas were constraining the 
activities of mills; that the current 100,000 tonne ocean shipment 
of bulk whea t h.pplied; that the current throughputs a t ports were 
applicable; that imports of Australian wheat were excluded; and 
that final demand and initial supply (representative of a year of 
self-sufficiency) were completely inelastic. Appropriately, repre-
sentative costs of milling, shipping, and port handling charges 
were calcula ted and included a s cons tant cos ts along with other 
constant transport costs described in the previous chapter. Tne 
aim of constraining the model in this fashion Was to create a mar-
ket scenario that resembled the existing market in as many respects 
as possible. 
Not surprisingly, the solution of the capacita ted model depicted 
a market structure similar to that described i.n Chapter two. While 
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this is an aid in validating this version of the model, a complete 
validation is not possible as some specific wheat flows cannot be 
identified with existing statistics. In the solution of the capacitated 
model these flows can be thought of as the expected, rather than 
ac tual flow s. 
By quantifying expected current flows the solution to the capaci-
tated problem is at least able to give a full and consistent representa-
tion of a market structure which is capable of satisfying the demands 
of the market, given the existing constraints on the industry. This is 
especially helpful as it allows meaningful dual cost variables to be 
de rived. 
It will be recalled from section 3.3 that the optimal value s of 
dual variables show how the objective function would change with a 
U:1.it change in constraints of the model. For the supply and demand 
constraints of the model it is possible· to impute a relative marginal 
value of wheat and flour at each source or destination of the model. 
If it were assumed that a competitive market applied, then these 
relative marginal values could be assumed to represent competitive 
regional price differentials," because the forces of arbitrage would 
ensure minimum transfer costs between regions in the model. Infor-
mation on the competitive regional price differentials is currently 
unavailable as standardised prices for wheat and flour are paid 
throughout New Zealand. 
The dual variables for other constraints of the model show the 
amount by which the total cost would change for changes in milling 
and shipping constraints. Hence, it is possible to gain an indi:cation 
of the opportu:1.ity cost imposed by current polic y constraints and to 
show how short te rm change s in the indust ry' s structure might lead 
to lnarginal improveme nts in the market's perfo nnance. 
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To show that the model is reasonably representative of the 
existing industry it is necessary to validate the model by comparing 
total marketing costs and trade flows of the model with known 
marketing costs and trade flows. 
5.2.1 Validation - Wheat Flows 
Table 5.1 shows the solution obtained from the capacitated 
problem. This includes the volumes of wheat and flour moving from 
certain sources to particular destinations and the total supplies 
from, or receivals a t, various regional loca tions. It can be seen 
that producing areas supply their local mills. For example, the 
Southland region supplies the Invercargill mill with 9, 000 tonne s 
of wheat per annum. Two supply regions are also shown to supply 
South Island ports with wheat for bulk shipping; Southland supplies 
Bluff with 64, 000 tonnes, and South Canterbury supplies Timaru 
with 36, 000- tonnes. All remaining wheat from South Island supply 
regions moves to North Island mills by rail. For instance, 13, 000 
tonne s of whea t is railed from Ashburton to Mount Maunganui mill. 
On the extreme right hand side of Table 5.1 the totals supplied fro~ 
each production region are tabula ted. For example, Southland r s 
total supply is 73,100 tonnes. 
Initial destinations in Table 5.1 become secondary, or inter-
media te supply origins for other marke ting stage s of the model. 
For example, South Island mills are seen to supply local final demands 
wi. th flour; any surplus flour from these mills is seen to be transported 
mainly to Wellington, but also to other parts of the North Island and 
northern South Island. The whea t supplied to Bluff and Timaru in 
the first stage of Table 5.1 can be seen to be transferred to bulk 
ship in a secondary stage. At a tertiary stage this wheat is trans-
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be seen to move to respective mills in these regions. There it is 
milled to flour along with other South Island wheat received by ran 
before eventually being d,3livered to satisfy North Island dema'1.d 
re gions. 
The flow s of the current solution that could hot be validated 
relate mainly to the rail transfers of wheat from the South Isla!1d 
to North Island mills (20,000,13,900,13,000, 17,000tonnes from 
Ashburton to, respectively, Wellington, Palmerston North, Mount 
Maunganui, and Auckland, plus 100 tonnes frOIn Southland to Palmerston 
No rth). The se transfe r s are unknow n because Wheat Board data onl y 
recod.s the aggregate of inter-i.sland wheat flows by container sh.ip 
(roll on-roll off) and by rail ferry. Therefore the proportion of 
wheat railed compared to that shipped :n containers is u:lknown. 
Also intra South Island wheat transfers are not reported by the 
Wheat Board and cannot be verified. For these reasons, it is not 
possible to determine how closely the flows of the current solution 
resem"?le the actual flows that the Wheat Board would arrange i.n a 
year of self-sufficiency, although, it is known for i.nstance, that 
some containe r shipping and some rail transfer to North Island mills 
from Otago does actually occur. It is also known that container 
shipments via Lyttelton to North Island mills occur, but the current 
cost minimising model does not include sucb. flows which suggests 
that they are uneconOlnical. The model can, however, be validated 
in terms of the aggregate flows using these two modes of transport. 
The inter-island ran transfers of wheat shown in Table 5.1 were 
consistent with the aggregate figure s reported by the Wheat Board 
i. n year s of self- sufficienc y. 
Other differences between trade flows of Table 5.1 and 
known actual flows, relate to intra North Isla!1d and i.nter-island 
flour flows. The total inter-island flour trade of the model is for 
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46, 000 (w. e.) tonne s to be transported from the South to the North 
Island each year. This is close to the actual flow of approximately 
50, 000 w. e. to!lnes. However, the quantities of £lour received at 
North Island de s tina tiO!lS from South Island flour mills in the model 
are a t variance with actual receivals of South Island flour reported 
by the Whea t Board (Annual Report 1979). 
From actual receivals of South Island flour a t North Island 
destinations reported by the Wheat Board (various editions of its 
Annual Report) it is known tha t South Island flour is delivered through-
out the North Island. In contrast, the model indicates this flour 
should be used to meet the deficit mainly in the Wellington area and 
that intra-North Island £lour flows satisfy other North Island deficit 
regions. For instance, 14, 000 w.e. tonnes from Palmerston North 
should go to the East Coast/Hawkes Bay region and 15, 000 w.e. 
tonnes from Auckland to Mount Maunganui. 
Despite these discrepancies and uncertainties, the total market-
ing costs of the solution are close to those of the existing industry. 
Possi.bly this is because rail transfer and container shipping costs 
are not too di.£ferent (Tables 4.4 and 4.5), and that there LS little 
scope for reducing transport costs by re-organising the flour trade 
£lows in the North Island. 
5.2.2 Valida tion and Ma rketing Co sts 
The total marketing cost estimated for the solution WaS $19.56 m. 
This comprised $13.0 m freight and handling costs, and $6.56 m. 
milling costs. This is a close estimate of the total freight and mill-
ing costs of the existing industry. 
For the year ended 31 January 1979 the Wheat Board paid a 
total of $12.96 m. for freight. This includes freight on bran aCld 
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pollard and al so $1. 3 m. freight on 27,250 tonne s of imported whea t. 
These costs are not included as freight on equivalent New Zealand 
wheat. Hence, the actual comparable transport cost may be slightly 
Ie ss than $12.96 m. and therefore furthe r from the e s tima ted co s t 
of the model at $13. a m. Nevertheless, this divergence is not 
thought to be significant. 
The actual cost of mi11ing is not as readily available as freight 
costs. The latest available Industry Production Statistics (Department 
of Statistics, 1977) show the value added by the grain milling industry 
in the 1975-76 year to be $7.4 m. However, this aggregate includes 
the value added on bran, pollard and breakfast cereals, and therefore 
it is not possible to disaggregate the exact cost of flour milling from 
this statistic. Appendix 1 shows the Department of Trade and Industry 
calcula tions for the marketing mar gin paid to flour mills per tonne of 
wheat mi11ed from 1 February 1978. Although no longer applicable, 
this margin would have been equivalent to $24.67 atMay 1979. 
Multiplied by the volume of wheat handled at mi11s of 287, 000 tonnes 
per annum, a figure of $7 m. would be the derived cost of mi11ing. 
Again, this is close to the estimated cost of the model at $6.56 m. 
The fact that the estimated and actual costs are similar serves 
to provide a valuable reference point ($19.6 m.) to gauge the change s 
in market performance which could occur as the structure of the 
industry is changed in the model. Also, if the marketing costs of 
the model are a reasonable indica tion of the true social costs, the 
solution to the capacita ted problem may help identify one of the 
effects arising from the Government's standardised flour pricing 
policy. 
In chapter two it wa s show n how the high tra nsport co sts of 
remo te localitie s rela tive to proxima te locali tie s represented an 
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economic disadvantage to the remote region. Also, it Was suggested 
that if a standardised price was paid in each locality regardless of 
transport or other regional disadvantages, it would lead to a cross-
subsidisation from localised to remote regions. Informa tion arising 
from the solution to the capacitated problem can be used to estimate 
the current relative levels of cross-subsidisation among flour con-
sumers of different regions and among South Island wheat farmers 
of different regions. This may be useful information for policy 
makers. 
5.2.3 Consumer Welfare Implications 
Although the absolute spatial equilibrium prices for wheat and 
7 flour can not be estimated from the existing model, regional price 
differentials are produced. Regional flour price differentials for 
the capacitated model are presented in Table 5.2. These show the 
rela tive loca tional advantage of various final demand regions in 
proc urring an additional wheat equivalent tonne of flour. The se 
are the relative marginal values of flour in different regions based 
on extra transfer, handling and proce ssing cos ts, but excluding 
production costs of growing whea t. In as suming a competitive mar-
ket where the forces of arbitrage operate, these values can be 
assumed to repre sent regional flour price differentials. 
The regional price differentials of Table 5.2 show the relative 
marginal values of flour at various final demand regions. These are 
relative to the lowest price region, Otago. For example, the relative 
marginal value of flour in Southland is $19.00 more than in Otago. 
This differential represents the relative disadvantage of Southland 
in procurring an additional wheat equivalent tonne of flour compared 
to Otago. 
7 
These could not be determined on account of the fact that initial 
production costs (supply responses) for wheat were not included 
in the model, nor were estimates of demand functions - these 
were assumed to be completely inelastic also. 
TABLE 5.2 
Regional Flour Price Differentials 
-and Consumer Cross-Subsidisation 
$/W. E. Tonne 
Regional Consumer Price a 
Differentials Tax 
Regions 
Southland 19 32.97 
Otago (South and Central) 0 51.97 
North Otago 5 46.97 
South Canterbury 9 42.97 
Mid Canterbury 12 39.97 
Christchurch (Districts 
and Westland 16 35.97 
Nelson/Marlborough 39 12.97 
Wellington (Excluding 
Palmerston North 56 - 4.03 
Palmerston North 65 -13.03 
Taranaki 73 -21.03 
East Coast/Hawkes Bay 83 - 31 • 03 
South Bay of Plenty 74 -22.03 
Auckland/North Auckland 63 -11.03 
! 
Weighted Average of Consumer Price Di££erential = $51.97. 
a . Negahve consumer tax = a consumer subsidy. 
n. 
















Tne area with the greatest relative disadvantage is the East 
Coa st/Ha wke s Bay region. There, the marginal value of £lour is 
$ 83.00 grea ter than Otago. It Can be seen from Table 5.2 tha t the 
regional price differentials do not simply increase with transport 
distance from the least price region. This is partly a result of the 
different costs of alternative modes of transport that are used by 
the Wheat Board along certain routes, and also it is a result of the 
regional differences of other processing and handling costs. 
The existing standardised £lour pricing scheme of Government 
does not re£lect the relative regional values of £lour. The implica-
tions arising from this can be observed by comparing the weighted 
average of all regional price differentials, $51.97, to the respective 
price differentials of Table 5.2 
The $51.97 value can be used to represent the New Zealand 
wide cost of distributing the £lour. This can be considered to be 
the standardised price relative to price differentials. 8 It can be 
seen from Table 5.2 that if thi s s tanda rdised price applied in Otago 
the price of £lour would be $51.97 higher in Otago than under a 
differential pricing scheme. This implies that under a standardised 
pricing scheme, Otago consumer s pa y a tax which i.s used to subsi-
dise other regions such as Auckland, where the differential price 
is $63.00 above that of Otago and $11 • 03 above the standardised 
price. 
Under a standardised pricing scheme, all regions where the 
£lour price differential is below the weighted average would pay 
more than the marginal value of £lour in those regions,.l:Jy the amount 
of the consumer taxes shown in Table 5.2. Conversel~r, those regions 
8 This standardised price is such that the sum of the consun:er tax 
is equivalent to the sum of the subsidy paid to consumers of other 
regions. 
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where the marginal value of flour is greater than the weighted 
average would pay less than the marginal value of flour in those 
regions, and would enjoy a negative consumer tax or subsidy. 
Regardless of the actual level of the standardised flour price 
relative to the differentials of Table 5.2, the current flour prLcLng 
polic y of Gove rnment insulate s the market from the economic fo rce s 
that the locational disadvantages or price differentials represent. 
By ignoring these differentials, the standardised flour pricing 
scheme of Gove rnment ope rate s as a di sc riminato r y taxation scheme 
indirectly affecting the distribution of income. The estimates of 
taxes and subsidies provided here show the relative (but not neces-
sarily the absolute) level of discrimination caused by ignori.ng 
differentials. This may be useful information for policy makers 
wishing to evaluate the equity of Government1s standardised Gour 
pricing p.")licy. 
In the current industry it would appear that the standardised 
flour price is close to the average per unit financial costs of the 
industry (see Appendix 3). The price for flour effective from 
I February 1979 was $270.00. Table 5.2 presents a list of flour 
prices which show the marginal values of flour in respective regions 
if the current standardised flour price were to be modified to reflect 
regional price differentials. 
5.2.4 Producer Welfare Implications 
Regional wheat price differentials for the capacitated model 
are pre sented in Table 5.3. These show the relative locational 
advantage of various production regions in supplying an additional 
tonne of wheat. These are based on extra transfer, handling and 
processing costs and exclude production costs of growing wheat. 
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TABLE 5.3 
Regional Wheat Price Differentials 
and Producer Cross-Subsidisation 






















3 0 52 
13. 52 
Weighted average of regional price differentials = 14.48 
The regional price differentials of Table 5.3 sh.ow that the 
marginal value of wheat is $28.00 per tonne more in North 
Canterbury than in Southland. By implication, it is worth paying 
farmers an extra $28.00 per tonne of wheat in North Canterbury 
than farmers in Southland. However, under the Government's 
standardised wheat price scheme, a fixed price is pai.d to farmers 
regardless of their proxi.mity. If this standardised price can be 
represented by the weighted average of price differentials, then 
estimates of the relative producer tax of farmers in vari.ous 
regions can be calculated. 9 These are also shown in Table 5.3. 
9 This representative standardised pri.ce is such that the sum 
of the producer tax (i.e. tax times quantit;,r) is equivalent to 
the total of the subsidy paid to farmers in other regions. 
The producer taxes of Table 5.3 imply that under a standardised 
pricing scheme North Canterbury farmers are paying a per unit 
tax of $13.52 to subsidi se othe r regions such as Southland, where 
the marginal value is $28.00 below that of North Canterbury and 
$14.48 below the standardised price. Other subsidies Can be seen 
to be paid to Otago farmer s and other taxe s by farmer s in North 
Otago and northwards. 
Again it has been shown how the standardised pricing scheme 
of Government operates as a discriminatory taxation scheme when 
price differentials are ignored. This information may be of interest 
to policy makers concerned with the equity of Government's standar-
di sed whea t pricing scheme. However, the se figures should be 
interpreted wi th caution. 
It should be noted that the regional price differentials of 
Table 5.3 are not competitive equilibrium prices. First of all, 
production responses to price differentials of Table 5.3 are 
absent because wheat supplies are assumed to be completely 
inelastic; this may be unrealistic. If production responses, and 
therefore supply elasticities, could be included in the model it 
is likely that these would alter the levels of production in different 
regions. This could lead to an alternative set of regional price 
diffe rentials. 
Secondly, the price differentials of Table 5.3 and of Table 
5.2 are not competitive equilibrium prices because of the many 
protective Government constraints and controls operating to pre-
vent competition occurring in the industry. For instance,) the 
fact tha t the throughput of bulk shipping is limi ted to 100,000 
tonnes and that Bluff is restricted to supply 64, 000 tonnes of 
this, may expalin why extra wheat in Southland has less value 
than wheat in Mid Canterbury. Des-l?ite the fact that bulk shipping 
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costs from respective ports of these regions are equivalent, if 
no more than 64,000 tonnes of wheat can be loaded through Bluff, 
any extra whea t exported from the region must do so by train to 
say, the North Island. Compared to the cost of railing wheat to 
the North Island from Ashburton the cost from Southland may 
place Southland farmers at a relative disadvantage. Hence, the 
margin value of whea t in Southland would be expec ted to be Ie s s 
than tha t in Ashburton. 
As discussed in chapter 4, it is possible to meaSure the 
opportunity cost imposed by the constraints of the capacitated 
model; that is the cost saving forgone by not being able to increase 
say the loading capacity at Bluff by one unit. This cost could 
alternatively be interpreted as the marginal value of increasing 
Bluff's throughput by one unit. 
5.2.5 Opportunity Costs of Existing Market Constraints 
Table 5.4 pre sents the opportunity costs imposed by con-
straints on transhipment acti vi tie s of the model. 
TABLE 5.4 
Marginal Opportunity Costs of Constraints 
($/wheat equivalent tonne) 
Mills J:.Q..tl Bulk Ship 
Inve rcar gill 30 Bluff 22 Bulk Ship 
Dunedin 0 Dunedin Ro-Ro 0 
Oamaru 0 Timaru 8 
Timaru and Temuka 2 Lyttelton 0 
Ashburton 6 Lyttelton Ro-Ro 0 
Chris tchure h/Rangiora 0 Wellington 0 
Wellington 1 7 Mount Maunganui 9 
Palmerston North 17 Auckland 8 




The figures of Table 5.4 serve as an indication of the marginal 
value of removing current constraints (or alternatively the marginal 
opportunity cost currently imposed by these constraints). These 
values suggest that increased bulk shipping with extra loadi_ng at 
Bluff and Timaru, and unloading at Auckland and Mou:-lt Maunganui 
may lead to cost savings. Also, increased milling in the lower 
North Island might lead to cost savings, as might the increased 
milling in Ashburton, and to a less extent, Timaru/Temuka. 
Inc rea sed milling at Timaru/Temuka might re sult in a co st 
saving because flour from these regions supplied to Wellington 
might save transporting flour from the more remote Dunedin mill 
to Wellington. However, as with all these marginal values, the 
ceteris paribus assumption upon which they are based means their 
relevance will only hold for very small changes. If Wellington 
milling capacity was increased enough, flour from Timaru and 
Temuka may no longe r be required which could cause the extra 
output of these mills to have zero marginal value. Alternatively, 
dropping shipping constraints may dec rease the value of wheat 
at Mount Maunganul mills. Then the marginal value of additional 
milling capacity might be high compared to its present zero value. 
The mar ginal value of $3 O. 00 at Inve rca rgill mill onl y applie s 
in a downward direction. That is, a decrease in milling capacity 
of one tonne at Invercargill would increase costs by $30.00. An 
increase in milling capacity there would not lead to a cost saving. 
This is caused by limitations imposed from other constraints. 
Despite the uncertainties of interpreting the figures of Table 
5.4, the fact the constraints are shown to cause opportunity costs 
to the existing industry demonstrates that it may be worthwhile to 
examine the effects of removing constraints in the model. 
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Further, the fact the economies of scale in milling and shipping are 
possible, complicates the interpretation of the marginal values of 
Table 5.4. This occurs because, for ~nstance, each addCtional unit 
of milling allows a mill to experi.ence decreasing per unit costs. 
Only the solutLon without the current constraints, and where scale 
effects are represented, can determine exactly which regions and 
activities of the industry should increase or decrease in the long 
term. By identifying where short- run costs occur and by studying 
long-run solutions of an unconstrained industry, it is possible for 
polic y make r s to see how to move from the sho rt - rU::1 to the mo st 
efficient long- run situation. 
5.3 Inc rea sed Bulk Shipping Capacity 
In allowing an unrestricted flow of wheat to be transferred to 
the North Island by bulk ship, it was also necessary to allow an 
unrestricted amount of wheat to move through port storage facilities, 
including the proposed receival port faciJities at Auckland, Mou::1t 
l\Ilaunganui and Wellington. 1 0 Accordingly, capacity constraints 
were lifted and the shipping and port activities of the model were 
allowed to handle any quantity of wheat at the cost dictated by thei.r 
respective long-run ave rage cost curves. The Stammer heuristic 
search technique was used to analyse the effects of economies of 
scale in these activities. At this stage no attempt was made to use 
the force routine of Higham, et. al. (op cit). All other activities 
of the model were assumed to be constrained as in the first run. 
10 As discussed in the previous chapter, additional storage was 
considered necessary to hasten u:lloadt.ng and to provide 
security of codinued supply of wheat to North Island mills. 
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5.3.1 S?lutiQn Numbe r Two 
The best solution obtained using the Stammer method, produced 
a total cost to the industry of $17.7 m.; a saving of $1.87 m. over 
the solution 0 btained in the comple tely capaci tated problem. Thi s 
solution is shown in Table S. S. 
The saving of $1.87 m. arose from the increased economy 
a ttained in the transport of an extra 64, 000 tonne s of whea t to the 
North Island by bulk ship. PreviouslY1 this had been transported 
by (fail which is a more expensive. means of transport. 
The extra volume of bulk shipping enabled economies of 
scale to be exploited in this shipping operation, lowering the cost 
per tonne from over $3 5.00 (on 100,000 tonne s of whea t) to $18. 00 
per tonne (on 164,000 tonnes of wheat). However, part of this 
.benefit was eroded by the additional cost of establishing and running 
extra unloading and storage facili tie s at receival ports. The total 
costs at loadi.ng ports did not change significantly, although their 
relative cost was altered owing to the change in relative volumes 
handled a t each port. 
The volumes of wheat handled at ports in the solutions of 
Table 5.1 and 5.5 are summarised in Table 5.6 
It can be seen from Table 5.6 that the increased tonnage of 
whea t transferred to the North Island by bulk ship is loaded mainly 
at Timaru. This increased by 61,000 tonnes over the volume in 
the solution to the capacitated problem. Bluff increased its load-
ing by 3,000 tonnes. The volumes of wheat received at North 
Island ports increased in accordance with that necessary to fulfill 
the milling quotas in each region, and replaced the receivals of 
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Dropping the shipping and port constraints also caused change s 
in some intra - South Island whea t and flour trade flow s, and inter-
island flour trade flows. By comparing Table 5.1 with 5.5 it can 
be seen, however, that these changes were not great. 
TABLE 5.6 
Volumes of Wheat Handled a t Discharge 
and Rec eiyal Po rts 








Mount Maunganui 30,000 
Auckland 100,000 
164,000 







The overs.ll realloc:ations of whea t and flour shipments did not 
alter the regional flour price differentials. These did not change 
because flour is delivered to final demand regions from ba sicall y 
the Same mills as previously, and the opportunity costs of deliver-
ing from alternative regions are also much the same despite changes 
in the regional wheat price differentials. 
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5.3.2 Re gional Whea t Pric e Di fferentials 
The set of wheat price differentials of Solution Number Two 
are given in Table 5.7. The previous differentials are also included 
for comparison. 
TABLE 5.7 
Regional Whea t Price Differentials (2) 
($ / tonne whea t) 
Region Solution No. 2 
Southland 5 
Otago 0 
North Otago 9 
South Canterbury 12 
Ashburton 10 
Remaining Canterbury 20 







It is interesting to note that the range of price differentials 
has decreased from 0-28 to 0-20 in the new solution reflecting 
the increased efficiency of transporting activities. Also of interest, 
is the fact tha t the rela tive mar ginal value of whea t in Southland 
has increased quite notably owing to the increased demand for 
Southland wheat for bulk shipping. 
The differentials of Table 5.7 represent the marginal values 
of wheat in respective production regions given complete protec-
tion from interna tional trade. From Solu tion Number Two it is 
pos sible to obtain the rela ti ve mar ginal value of whea t in Sydne y 
(F.O. B.) assuming production cost in all regions, including 
Sydney, to be ze ro. 11 
11 
It will be recalled from chapter 4 tha t a simple modifica tion 
of the model would allow Sydney to be included a s a potential 
supply point; Sydney has been included in the rna trix from 
whic h solution two is derived. 
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5.3.3 Opportunity Cost of Import Controls 
The relative value of wheat supplied from Sydne y is $2 O. 00 
and therefore it is $20.00 above the margLnal value of wheat in 
Otago. A major reason why this value LS high relative to the South 
Island regions LS that the wheat is assumed to be purchased F.O.B. 
The cost of shipping from Sydney to New Zealand therefore does 
not include farm to port or loading cost in Australia. This implies 
that if quantitative controls on imports of Syd~1.ey wheat were redllced 
by one unit, a $20.00 saving in marketing costs could result from 
importing one tonne of wheat. It should be noted that the marginal 
value of wheat in Sydney would be expected to decline if extra units 
we re imported. 
The $20.00 marginal value of wheat in Sydney (F .0. B.) holds 
important implications for the relative wheat price in different 
regions of New .?:ealand. The i.mplied price differentials of South 
Island regions set relative to Sydney are presented [n Table 5.8. 
TABLE 5.8 
Regional Wheat Price Differentials 


















The relative pri.ce dLfferentials of Table 5.8 are the amounts 
by which the price in South Island regions would ~eed to be below 
the Sydney F .0. B. price to prevent wheat imports entering New 
Zealand at lower cost. This is assuming an unrestricted entry of 
Australian wheat and assuming a completely elastic wheat supply in 
Sydney. The differentials show that Sydney is a highly competitive 
supply point. For this reason, an experiment was conducted where 
the model was ru~1. in the absence of the quantitative import control. 
The results of this run showed that if the full 164,000 tonnes of wheat 
shipped to the North Island in Solution Two were instead procured 
from Sydney, total industry costs could be reduced to $15.8 m. 
Compared to Solution Two, this represents an additional saving of 
$1. 9 m. 
All wheat delivered to the North Island in the modified model 
came from Sydney because prices of wheat at Sydney F .0. B. and 
12 
at South Island regions F.O.R. were assumed equal and fixed. 
If such a change were to actually occur, however, the price of wheat 
in South Island regions would decline as farmers sought to compete 
against Sydney's supply advantage. This would lower the relative 
marginal value of wheat in Sydney (or perhaps more und,erstandably, 
lower the relative opportunity cost of not importing wheat from 
Sydney). At the lower South Island prices, South Island farmers 
would still be prepared to supply wheat, but probably at reduced 
quantities. The South Island price and quantity of wheat would 
continue to decline until the Sydney (F.O.B.) price plus marketing 
costs to say Auckland was equivalent to the discounted South Island 
price plus respective marketing costs to Auckland. Under these 
circumstances Auckland could be supplied from both Sydney and 
12 
This LS a reasonable assurnptLon based on a ministerial com-
parison of New Zealand F. O. R. price s and the price spaid fo r 
Imported Australian wheat. 
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South Island regions. Savings in marketing costs would result from 
the importing of additional wheat from Sydney, while savings in the 
form of reduced costs of purchasing discounted wheat would result 
from purchases of New Zealand wheat. In this internationally com-
petitive situation all New Zealand prices would respond to changes 
in the international wheat price (F .0. B. Australia). 
It is not possible to determine full spatial equilibrium prices 
and quantities from the existing model because respective supply 
functions of the production regions are not included in the model. 
Also, because there are non-linear shipping and port costs and, 
therefore, the possibility of several alternative local optima, it 
is unlikely that there would be an unique set of spatial equilibrium 
prices and quantities. Nevertheless, information of the type 
reported in Table 5.6 may be of interest to policy makers concerned 
with setting the New Zealand wheat price. This information may 
be useful for it shows that the total industry costs could be reduced 
if New Zealand regional (F. O. R. ) wheat price s we re set according 
to the marginal value of wheat in these regions relative to the 
marginal value of wheat F.O.B. in Sydney and therefore made 
competitive. 
Additional competitive forces that co uld be included in the 
model are those relating to milling. Currently, milling quotas set 
by the Wheat Board prevent competition among mille r s. The 
marginal opportunity costs of milling quotas given unrestricted 
transport patterns are available from Solution Two. 
5.3.4 Opportunity Cost of Milling Quotas - Shippil.JZ.. 
Constraints Absent 
Table 5.9 presents the marginal opportu!lity costs of milling 
quotas for Solution Number Two. 
86. 
TABLE 5.9 
Relatiye Opt'ortunity Costs 
of Milling Quota~ (2) 




Tima ru and Temuka 
Ashburton 
C hri s tc hur c h / Rangiora 
Wellington 
Palmers ton North 












The marginal opportunity costs of quotas on North Island 
mills in Table 509 suggest that at least small increases in North 
Island milling capacities would lead to significant reductions in 
costs. The potential savi.ngs are explai.ned by two factors. Firstly, 
milling is cheaper in the North Island than in the South Island 
because of the larger mills currently operating in the North Island. 
Secondly, gi. ven that there are no re strictions on transporta tion in 
the model, increased milling in the North Island would allow bulk 
shipments of wheat to be substituted for currently more expensive 
rail transfers of flour from South Island mills to North Island 
final demand areas. 
A third set of forces not accounted for in the opportunity 
costs of Table 5.9 are the potential economies of scale in ship-
ping and milling. The se repre sent longer tenl1 economic re sponse s. 
87. 
Marginal measurements 0 nl y measure small short term change s. 
As a res.ult, it is possible that the long term value of increasing 
the Palmers ton North milling quota for example, may be nega tive, 
while the short term marginal value is $12.00. If the Wellington 
milling capacity alone was increased instead of both Wellington 
13 
and Palmerston North, total milling costs for the combined out-
put of both may be less. Therefore increasing milling in Palmerston 
North rna y in the longer term prevent Wellington reali sing its full 
economy of scale and thus expanding Palmerston North milling would 
ha ve an opportuni ty co st in the longer term. 
Only by running the model in the absence of milling quotas 
and allowing milling alloca tions to adjust according to the e stima ted 
long-run average cost curve of this processing operation would it 
be possible to estimate the importance of these factors. 
5.4 Ra tionali sation and Milling Ca pa citie s - Solution Number Three 
In the version of the model first used to analyse the rational-
i sa tion of milling capaci tie s there were no constraints on milling, 
shipping, loading or unloading. However, to simplify the analysis 
imports of Sydne y whea t were fir st re stricted to zero and scale 
effects in milling were assumed absent. This was achieved by 
retaining milling costs at their previous fixed levels. 
Table 5.10 summarises the results of the third solution. 
From the results to the ini tial ver sion of this virtually uncapaci-
ta ted problem it became a ppa rent tha t substantial co st reductions 
could be made by further centrali sing the transport opera tion 
of the industry. Thi s re sul ted from shipping whea t for milling 
instead of flour to the North Island. 
13 
Wellington and Palmers ton North are "geographically close ". 
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The minimum cost solution obtained using the Stammer 
method gave a total cost of $15.44 m. representing a saving of 
$2.26 m. over Solution Number Two. 
The saving of $2.26 m. arose from transporting an additional 
46, 000 tonnes of wheat to North Island mills by bulk ship. Previously 
the equivalent flour had been transported to the North Island by rail 
from South Island mills. 
The inc rea sed bulk shipping of Solution Three allowed greater 
economies of scale to be achieved in bulk shipping and at unloading 
ports. Bulk shipping increased from 164, 000 tonnes in Solution Two 
to 2 04, 000 tonne s in Solution Three. Thi s reduced per unit shipping 
costs from $18.00 to $15.00. Per unit unloading costs at Wellington 
reduced from $16. 00 on 34, 000 tonnes to $10. 00 on 53, 000 tonnes, 
and at Mount Maunganui costs reduced from $8. 00 on 30, 000 tonnes 
to $2. 00 on 151, 000 tannes. 
The unloading of Auckland r s milling whea tat Mount Maunganui 
accounts for the higher volume handled at tha t recei val port. As 
di scussed in the previous chapter a port storage and unloading 
facility at Auckland could be expensive compared to a similar 
facility at Mount Maunganui. Solution Three indicates that because 
of the greater economy of scale achieved by unloading the full 
151, 000 tonnes of wheat at the cheaper facility, the extra cost of 
transporting wheat to Auckland from Mount Maunganui is prefer-
able to the cost of unloadi.ng 85, 000 tonnes of wheat at Auckland 0 
Other cost savings resulting from Solution Three involve 
milling costs. Regardless of the potential economies of scale, 
current North Island per unit milling costs are estimated to be 
less than South Island costs because of the la~ger average 
size of mill. If it is as sumed tha t current North Island mills could 
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expand or contract according to the throughput levels of Table 
5.10 without altering their production costs, 46,000 tonnes of 
wheat could be milled in the North Island more cheaply than in 
the south. 
From Table 5.10 it can be seen that the expansion of the 
Wellington milling quota to 55,000 tonnes per annum and of the 
MOI~nt Mau::1ganui quota to 66, 000 tonne s has re sulted in both 
islands being self-sufficient in the milling of flour. Many regions 
are also self- sufficient in flour production. In the South Island 
the only intra-island regional transfer of flour is for 10,000 tonnes 
to be transported to the Nelson/Marlborough district. In the North 
Island intra-island regional transfe rs from Mount Maunganui occ ur. 
All othe r regions of the model are self- suffic ient in flour production. 
The new market structure of Table 5.10 would cause changes 
in both the regional flour and wheat price differentials. 
5.4.1 Regional Flour Price Differentials 
The final demand regional flour price differentials of Solution 
Three are presented in Table 5.11. The previous differentials have 
been included fo r comparison. 
From Table 5.11 it can be seen that the relative marginal 
values of flour have declined in most final demand regions in mov-
ing from Solution Two to Solution Three. The ove rall range of 
values can be seen to have declined from $0-$83.00 per wheat 
equivalent tonne down to $0-$51.00 (East Coast/Hawkes Bay). The 
only regions whe re the relative marginal value s of flour would 
increase are in North Otago and South Canterbury. These increases 
can be explained by a complex chain of changing demands for wheat 
Regions 
Southland 








Regional FIQur Price Djfferentials 
(Solution 1bree) 





7 19 Wellington (Excluding 
0 0 Palmerston North 
10 5 Palmerston North 
12 9 Taranaki 
11 12 East Cost/Hawkes Bay 
South Ba y of Plenty 





















and flour but are also a result of an increased demand for wheat 
required for bulk shipping from these regions. It might be con-
cluded that milling quotas, by lowering the demand for wheat in 
these regions in Solution Two, served to give these regions an 
artificially lower relative disadvantage in procurring their extra 
14 
tonne of flour (compared to Otago). In contrast, all other regions, 
except for Otago, experienced artificially high locational disad-
vantages in Solution Two (relative to Otago) due to milling quotas. 
Table 5.1 I shows that the quotas caused marginal values of 
flour production to be most distorted in the North Island. In the 
South Bay of Plenty region the locational disadvantage can be seen 
to decline from $74.00 per tonne with quotas down to $39.00 with-
out quotas. The range of South Island regional wheat price differ-
entials also narrowed. 
5.4.2 Regional Wheat Price Differentials 
Table 5.12 shows the new set of regional wheat price differ-
entials for Solution Number Three. The previous differentials are 
included for comparison. 
The relative marginal values of South Island regions increase 
in Table 5.12 as a result of increased demand for wheat at the ports 
to which these regions supply. The increased demand is a result 
of the additional 46, 000 tonne s transported by bulkship. 
14 
It must be remembered these regional advantages and dis-
advantages are concealed by the standardised flour price 
in the current market. 
93 .• 
TABLE 5.12 
Regional Wheat Price Differentials 




Southland 10 5 
Otago 0 0 
North Otago 14 9 
South Canterbury 17 12 
Ashburton 15 10 
Remaining Canterbury 17 20 
Sydney 22 20 
The decline in the relative marginal value of wheat in Mid 
and North Canterbury is a result of the relatively high cost of 
transpo rting 6, 000 tonne s of surplus wheat from this region. 
Previously the milling quota of this region had created artificially 
high local demands for wheat which meant that 2,000 tonnes of 
wheat were actually imported into the region. 
The inc rea sed marginal value s of whea t in South Island 
regions supplying to either Timaru or Bluff are the Cause of the 
increase in the marginal value of whea t in Sydney. These increased 
values of whea t in South Island regions represent an additional 
cost of not importing wheat from Sydney. By dropping the import 
constraint to estimate the net cost saving of forcing New Zealand 
pri.ces to be competitive with Sydney prices, total industry costs 
were reduced to $12.7 m. This represents an additional cost 
94. 
saving of $2.7 m. over Solution Three. As discussed previously, 
although dropping this constraint is valid for calculating this 
specific piece of informa tion on co sts, the model Can not determine 
what might be a rational market structure because the model does 
not embody production costs of growing wheat in different regions. 
Consequently, it is not possible to calculate the long run proportions 
of Sydney and South Island whea t tha t should be supplied to the North 
Island. For the Same reason it is not possible to calculate useful 
dual informa tion from such a model. 
5.5 Rationalisation and Scale Economies of Milling 
Because of the limi ted informa tion tha t Can be attained when 
the import constraint of the model is dropped, this was reintroduced 
to the model to study the effects of non-linear milling costs. 
The introduction of non-linear milling costs to the model 
meant that several, if not many, local optima solutions might 
exist. Although previously non-linear shipping and port handling 
costs were introduced these did not create any apparent alterna-
tive optima problems. 15 To take account of the problems intro-
duced by non-linear milling costs, the Stammer method was used 
in conjunction with the forcing technique of Higham, et. al. This 
made it possible to examine several low cost solutions. 
From the several low cost solutions generated using this 
version of the model, it became apparent tha t furthe r cos t 
reductions could be obtained by centrali sing the milliItg opera tions 
of the industry. This highlights the dispersed and fragmented 
struc hire of the current industry. 
15 ' One exception was the possibility of loading enough Ashburton 
whea t through Lyttelton to aC hieve sufficient economie s of 
scale in bulk loading there. Tnis may have allowed 6, 000 
tonnes of wheat otherwise shipped in containers to be shipped 
by more economical bulk ship. This Was not tested, but nor 
wa s 6, 000 tonne s of whea t conside red significant. 
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5. 5. 1 N urn be r 0 f Mill sin E a c h Re gi 0 :1 
Onl y if the long- run ave rage co st curve of an activity has a 
minimum, indicating a maximum size beyon.d which internal prodac-
tion diseconomies of scale occur, will the duplication of facUities 
in any locality lead to a saving in total costs. Such a diseconomy 
can be seen to occur at point A on the "u" shaped LRAC curve of 
Figure 5.1 but as discussed previously, it is assumed in this study 
that internal diseconomies do not occur in milling. Inst~ad a con-
tinuously decreasing LRAC curve is assumed. This is shown in 
Figure 5.1 as the "decreasing milling cost curve ". Because of the 
nature of this curve, milling costs can always be reduced in a region 
by milling in the largest possible mill, rather than in several mills 
al1 with higher per unit mil1ing costs. Accordingly, the current 
version of the model assumed only one mill should be present in 
any regi.on. 
The inter-regional Case is not so simple. The addition 
of transport and handling co sts crea te external di seconomie s for 
a mill. The "u" shaped LRAC curve of Figure 5.1 show s tha t 
diseconomies will occur once increasing per unit transport costs 
are greater than decreasing per unit milling costs past point A. 
Transport cost will increase for instance when extra flour pro-
duced to achieve milling economies must be delivered to points 
further from the place of milling. For this reason, the rational 
number, size, and location of mills in New Zealand as a whole, 
can only be determined by carefully analysing the trade-off 
between lower milling costs and increasing assembly and distri-
bution transport cos ts whic h re sult from centralisa tiona 
96. 




Maximum Size of Mill According to 
Shape of LRAC Curve 
IIU II shaped long- run 
average cost curve 
(Also combined trans-
port and milling cost 
curve) 





A Quantity (tonnes) 
5.5.2 Solution Number Four 
The best solution obtained using the Stammer method produces 
a total cost of $13.8 m. This represents a saving of $1. 64 m. over 
I 
Solution Number Three. Solution Number Four is presented in 
Table 5.13. 
Solution Four suggests there should only be a total of six 
mills i.n New Zealand. These should be located close to the major 
pockets of human popula tion. In Auckland and in Inve rcargi.1l the se 
mills should only fulfill the flour demand in their respective regions. 
TABLE 5.13 
Solution Numb;; r FouJ;: 
OOOIS tonnes 
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Other mills should supply flour to regions without mills. Dunedin 
should supply its own region, North Otago, and part of South 
Canterbury's demand; Christchurch should supply all remaining 
16 
South Island demands including 3,300 tonne s to South Canterbury. 
In the North Island it can be seen that Wellington should supply 
itself and Palmerston North, and Mount Maunganui should supply 
the remaining North Island regions apart from Aucklando 
Other structural changes occurring as a result of centralised 
milling are for different volumes to be handled at ports. Table 5.14 
shows the respective volumes handled in Solutions Three and Four. 
TABLE 5.14 
Tonnes of Whea t Handled at Ports 




Bluff 69 73.1 
Timaru 141 13 0.9 
Lyttelton Ro-Ro 0 6.0 
Wellington 59 53.0 
Mount Ma unganui 151 151.0 
The opportunity to load an additional 10,000 tonnes of wheat 
at TImaru would arise because of the lack of mills between Dunedin 
and Christchurch. 'The wheat milled to flour for these regions 
would come from wheat in North Canterbury and Otago. This would 
16 . Chnstchurch does not supply the full 4,400 tonnes of flour 
required in South Canterbury, because to do so would require 
importing wheat to Christchurch from other regions. 
99. 
eliminate North Canterburyls previous 6, 000 tonne surplus and 
Wellington would receive an addi tional 6, 000 tonne s by bulk ship 
instead of by Ro-Ro container shipments from Lyttelton. Hence, 
bulk shipping would increase to 6, 000 tonnes which is too small a 
change to effect the economy of scale of bulk shipping. 
The effects of these small changes in demand for wheat in 
South Island regions were not enough to affec t the rela ti ve marginal 
values of wheat in respective production regions. However, the 
rela tive marginal values of flour in respective final demand regions 
did change. 
5.5.3 Regional Flour Price Differentials 
Table 5.15 shows the new set of regional flour price differen-
tials for Solution Four. Those of the previous solution have been 
included for purpose s of compari son. 
The increases in the relative marginal values of flour in 
some South Island regions, namely Southland, North Otago and 
South Canterbury, are explained by the lower milling costs achieved 
in Dunedin and Christchurch, and the transport costs from these 
mills to other South Island regions. Attention should be drawn to 
the fact tha t these value s Sa y nothing -a.bout the absolute value of 
flour. They simply show the locational disadvantage of final 
demand regions in procurring their extra tonnes offlour relative 
to Otago. Therefore, if the marginal value of Otago flour drops, 
the relative disadvantage of some regions may increase. 
The regions whose relative disadvantage decreases most as 
a result of milling scale economies are Christchurch and Nelson/ 
Marlborough. By centralising milling in Christchurch, this allows 
this region to exploit its fulilocational·advantage. This advantage 
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lies in its proximity to a large pocket of demand and allows this 
milling location to substantially reduce its milling costs. Tnis 
rela tive advantage can be seen to spill over into the Christchurch 
and Nelson/Marlborough final demand regions. 
TABLE 5.15 
Regional Flour Price Differentials (4) 








Christchurch (Districts and Westland) 
Nelson/Marlborough 
Wellington (Excluding Palmerston North) 
Palmerston North 
Taranaki 
East Coast/HaWkes Bay 
South Bay of Plenty 





























The reduction in milling costs in the North Island are not as 
great. Hence the spillover advantages are also not as marked and 
therefore the decline in the rela tive disadvantage s of North Island 
final demand regions are not as great as that in Christchurch. 
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The regional flour price differentials of Table S.l 5 are those 
resulting from one local optimum solution to the current problem. 
Alterna tive local optima rna y ha ve different se ts of regional fl::)Ur 
price differentials. It is possible that an alternative market 
structure could produce a solution with similar or reduced total 
costs. It may be recalled from discussion in chapter three that 
a knowledge of marginal opportunity costs or marginal value 
products is not sufficient to determine which possible changes in 
market structure might lead to solutions of reduced costs, but that 
instead some other rules might be useful to identify possible areas 
of improvement in the model's solution. One such rule is: 
if there are two locations present in a stable solution, 
which are "geographically close ", one of them is a 
good candida te for "forcing out". 
In Solution Four. Auckland and Mount Maunganui could be 
considered to be two loca tions which are "geographically close ". 
For this reason it was decided to force Auckland from the solution 
and generate an alterna tive local optimum solution. 
5. S. 4 Solution Number Fiye - Auckland Milling Forced Out 
Solution Five differs from Solution Four in that the entire 
northern North Island flour is milled at, and supplied from, Mount 
Maunganui instead of both Mount Maunganui and Auckland. This 
gives a solution with only two mills in the North Island and three 
in the South. This change results in a reduction of total marketing 
costs by $0.2 m. 
While centralisation of the milling operation at Mount 
Maunganui resulted in higher tran,sport costs of a more specialised 
product, flour, instead of wheat from Mount Maunganui to Auckland, 
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the extra economies of scale resultingfrom increased milling at 
Mount Maunganui more than compensa ted for the increased trans-
port costs. Table 5.16 show's the magnitude of these costs for 
Solution Four and Five; the difference between the costs of these 
solutions is also shown. 




Marketing Cost Comparison -
Solution Four/Solution Fiye 
($m. ) 
Total North Total NorthIsland Total North 
Island Milling Port to Mill Island Flour 














In Table 5.16 it can be seen that .flour delivery costs increase 
by $.17 m more than the wheat assembly costs decrease (i.e. $.935 m. -
$.765 m. = $.17 m.), however, the centrali sation of milling at Mount 
Maunganui ra ther than a t Mount Maunganui and Auckland more than 
compensa te s for thi s increa se where the greater economy of scale 
in milling reduces costs by $.368 m. Hence the $.198 m. reduction 
in co sts (rounded = $.2 m. ). 
The effect that the overall reductions have on the regional 
flour price differentials are shown in Table 5.17. 
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Total North Island unloading, milling and transport costs included 
costs associated with Wellington, which remain constant. 
TABLE 5.17 
18 
Regional Flour Price Differentials 





East Coast/Hawkes Bay 43 
South Ba y of Plenty 31 







It is interesting to note that closing down all milling in Auckland 
would be of no advantage to Auckland consumers as there would be 
no change in the margi.nal value of flour in that region. It is thought 
that the additional cost of transporting.flour rather thaJ? wheat to 
Auckland is just compensated for by decreased milling costs. The 
other three North Island regions of Table 5.17 benefit by decreased 
milling costs without incurring increased transportation costs. 
The dec rea sed cost resulting from centralising a t Mount 
Maunganui, rather than at hnth Mount Maunganui and Auckland, 
does not mean centralisation at Auckland could not also provide 
a good solution. 
Although previously it wa s shown to be uneconomical to 
unload 85,000 tonnes at Auckland when this could instrad by unloaded 
at Mount Maunganui and transported to Auckland at a lesser cost, 
if 150,000 tonnes were unloaded at Auckland the additional economies 
of scale involved with unloading may make this a favourable loca tion 
for centralised milling. The increased economy of scale in unloading 
18 Price differentials in all other regi.ons did not change, and all 
differentials are set relative to Otago. 
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would not result in lower unloading costs than at Mount Maunganui, 
however, there would be a decrea se in the total transport bill whic h 
may off-set this cost. Tne cost of transporting 85,000 tonnes of 
flour (W. E.) from Mount Maunganui to Auckland would be a voided 
and whilst an extra cost of delivering flour from Auckland to the 
South Bay of Plenty region would be incurred, this would not be 
exce s si ve since the a verage co s t of delivering flour from :Nlount 
Maunganui to the South Bay of Plenty region is only $3. 00 less 
than from Auckland. The average cost of flour deliveries to the 
East Coast/Hawkes Bay area is $8. 00 greater from Auckland than 
Mount Maunganui in the model, and to Taranaki $4. 00 cheaper. 
Accordingly, Mount Maunganui was forced from the solution 
to analyse the effects of a centralised milling operation a t Auckland. 
5.5.5 Solution Number Six - Mount Maunganui Milling Forced 
Out 
Solution Si.x diffe rs from Solu non Five in tha t the entire 
norther n North Island flour is milled a t and supplied from Auckland 
instead of Mount Maunganui. Also, all wheat is assumed to be 
unloaded at Auckland instead of Mount Maunganui. Thi s solution 
re sults in the increase of total marketing co s ts by $.385 m. 
The magnitudes of the various marketing costs of Solutions 
Five and Si.x, and the difference between these are shown in Table 
5.18. It can be seen that the saving in total flour delivery costs 
arising from Solution Six compared to those costs of Solution Five 
are not enough to compensate for the increased total unloading and 
wharf to mill transport costs. 
While the overall increase in costs of $.385 m. is not a 
large increase it is interesting to note that the new set of market-
ing costs results in considerably different relative price differentials. 
These are shown in Table 5.19. 
TABLE 5.18 
Marketing Cost Comparison,-
Solution Five /Solutio n Six19 
($m) 
Total North Total North Total North 
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North Island Isla nd Flo ur To tal Port to Mill Island Island Unloading 
Costs 
Solution No.5 1.043 
Solution No.6 1.949 
















Regi.gnal Flour Price Differentials (6)20 





East Coast/Hawkes Bay 58 
South Ba y of Plenty 41 
Auc kland / Northland 30 
-19 
See note of Table 5.16. 











The comparative figures in Table 5.19 demonstrate that the 
relative disadvantages of final demand regions in procurring their 
extra flour supplies Can be sensitive to relatively small changes in 
the total marketing costs between different low cost solutions. This 
may hold important implications for those policy makers concerned 
wi th the equity of Government I s flour pricing polic y. The high 
sensiti vi ty of the se regional price differentials raise s important 
questions as to wha t might be "fair" regional flour price differentials 
to reflect the relative disadvantages of regions. 
The relatively small differences in the total costs of Solutions 
Four, Five, and Six suggest that the question of mill location in the 
northern North Island may be highly sensitive. In light of the uncer-
tainties surrounding some of the data used in this analysis, a closer, 
more rigorous study on the comparative costs of these regions 
might need to be undertaken before concluding which was the most 
fa voured site. 
The problem of mill size in the southern North Island is 
another problem that bears sensitive solutions. This Can be seen 
from Solution Number Seven. 
5.5.6 Solution Number Seven - Increased Milling at Wellington 
Among the several solutions genera ted from the itera tive 
solution procedure involved in deriving Solution Six, it was noticed 
that a second solution with a total cost of $14. 0425 m. had arisen. 
This cost is only $50, 000 greater than Solution Six. Solution Seven 
differ s from Solution Six by the amounts milled a t the two North 
Island mills. 
In Solution Seven the [inal demand requirements of the Ea st 
Coast/Hawke s Bay region are supplied from Wellington ins tead of 
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Auckland as is the case in Solution Six. This resulted in Wellington 
milling 76,000 tonnes (an increase of17,000 tonnes} and Auckland 
134, 000 tonnes (a decrease of 17,000 tonnes). This gives an indi-
ca tion Qf how sensitive the size of mill in the northern North Island 
and in Wellington is to relatively small changes in total costs. 
That is, for a .4 per cent change in total costs, there is an 11.26 
per cent change in the milling capacity needed in Auckland and a 
28.8 per cent change in that of Wellington. 
5.5.7 Solution Number Eig-ht - Invercargill Mill Forced Out 
Only one test was undertaken to measure the sensitivity of 
mill size in South Island regions. This involved forcing Invercargill 
mill from the solution. 
Solution Eight was similar to Solution Five. However, in 
Solution Eight the Dunedin mill supplied its own re~ion and that 
of Southland. This decreased the total demand for wheat in Southland 
and increased demand in Otago exhausting supplies in that region. 
As a result it became feasible to mill flour in Oamaru to supply 
North Otago and part of the South Canterbury demand. This change, 
however, increased total costs by" $.092 m. 
It is pos sible that other alterna tive low cost solutions could 
be found which would provide further information for policy" pur-
po se s by increasing the range of optional solutions to the industry's 
problem. With a range of solutions, policy makers could use other 
criteria to evaluate what might be the best rational market structure. 
For instance, it may be a secondary objective of policy makers to 
promote industry in a particular loca tion for regional development 
reasons. This may make the decision of mill location and size in 
the northern North Island more clear cut. However, rather than 
simpl y genera ting a range of solutions, it rna y be more worthwhile 
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using the model to genera te specific solutions to solve specific 
problems of policy makers. 
It should be remembered the model is only a simplistic 
representation of the industry and market. Once general principles 
of industry rationalisation have been identified from the simplistic 
analysis, policy makers may wish to examine the implications of 
these general principles when considering other Inore complex 
issues and problems of the industry. 
In light of the general principle s identified by the model, 
policy makers may wish to determine the extra total cost of perhaps 
moving a certain amount of milling capacity to the North Island 
from the South, subject to retaining some milling in each locality 
currently milling wheat to flour. This may be done to initiate the 
closing down of older and smaller units. 
Specific problems of the type sugge sted above could be solved 
using the model. However, without a knowledge of the specific, 
secondary objectives of policy makers, it is not known what other 
alternative solutions it would be useful to generate to study further 
is sue s of mill loca tion, number and size. 
5.6 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter it: has been shown how the market performance 
of the New Zealand wheat and flour industry might change in response 
to different market structures. More specifically, this involved 
examining the market performance of the existing industry compared 
to an indus try unre strained by current protective and insula ting 
cons tra ints. 
By examining the performance of the existing industry it 
Was possible to estimate the regional price differentials for wheat 
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and flour. Under the Government's current wheat and flour pricing 
policy this information is not available from the market place as 
prices are standardised throughout New Zealand. Further, standar-
dised pricing re sults in cross - subsidisa tion among flour consumer s 
of different re gions and also among farmer s of different regions. 
From respective price differentials, estimates of the relative levels 
of such subsidisationwere calculated. These suggested that the 
current pricing policie s of Government re sulted in significa nt income 
transfers from South Island flour consumers to North Island flour 
consumers and from South Island wheat farmers north of Oamaru 
to South Island wheat farmers south of Oamaru. 
It was also possible from the model of the existing industry 
to gain an indication of the opportunity- costs imposed by current 
shipping and milling constraints. These were shown to be high 
and, as such, were seen to be evidence that substantial savings 
might arise from lifting these constraints. Accordingly, shipping 
constraints and milling quotas were relaxed. Also, transport and 
processing costs were adjusted to take account of the potential 
economies of scale possible in an uncapacitated industry. 
From the several low cost solutions generated with the less 
constrained versions of the model, it became apparent that sub-
stantial cost reductions could be made by centralising both the 
transport and milling operations of the industry. This contrasts 
markedly with the fragmented and dispe rsed mark,=t structure of 
the exlsting industry. 
The results of the modified models would suggest that there should 
be no inter-island trade in flour and that an additlonal 46,000 w.e. tonnes 
of flour should be milled in the No rth Island with an equivale nt reduction to 
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be made in the South Island. Under this situation, 210, 000 tonnes 
of wheat would be required in the North Island per year. The results 
showed that substantial saving could be made by transporting this 
full tonnage by bulk ship. It waS shown that this would eliminate 
alternative expensive modes of transport, namely rail ferry and 
Ro -Ro container shipments of whea t and flour, and allow grea ter 
economies of scale in bulk shipping. The results also showed that 
potential economies of scale could be exploited i.n the milling 
operation. 
To take full opportunity of scale economies it Was shown that 
at most only one mill per region was required. In allowing central-
isation of milling between regions it was further shown that as few 
a s five mills would be all tha t were required in a ra tionali sed industry. 
This would require one mill of between 135, 000 and 150, 000 tonnes 
in the northern North Island, preferably at Mount Maunganui, one 
of between 55, 000 and 75, 000 tonnes in Wellington, another of 50, 000 
tonnes in Christchurch, 18, 000 in Dunedin, and 9, 000 in Invercargill. 
As a result of the location of mills in the North Island appropriate 
amounts of whea t would need to be unloaded from bulk ship a t Mount 
Maunganui and Wellington. In the South Island, results showed tha t 
in a year of self-sufficiency, 70, 000 tonnes of wheat should be loaded 
to bulk ship at Bluff and 140, 000 tonnes at Timaru. (To facilitate 
loading and unloading, and to provide additional buffer stock storage 
at the four ports involved, it had been assumed that 6, 000 tonne 
port storage facilities were available.) 
From the modified models it was also possible to measure 
the marginal value of wheat in Sydney relative to wheat at farms 
in South Island regions. This value was shown to be high and 
suggested that if F .O.R. prices for wheat in the South Island were 
to compete with the Sydne y F .0. B. price, further substantial 
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reductions in total costs could be made. However, because supply 
functions of respective regions were not included in the model it 
was not possible to give any indication what proportions of wheat 
should be supplied from respective sources under a free-trade 
situa tion wi th Aust ralia. 
The model used to genera te the re sul ts presented in this 
chapter is only a simplistic repre sentation of the struc tural prob-
lems in the wheat and flour industry. For this reason the results 
can only be interpreted as showing the general principles of industry 
ra tionali sa tion. 

CHAPTER 6 
LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATICUNS AND EXTENSIONS 
OF THE MODEL 
6.1 Introduction, 
The results presented in the previous chapter have shown 
that the model developed i.n this stud y has c onsi.de rable potential 
to aid in the analysis of problems in the wheat and flour industry. 
It is important however, to realise that there are limitations to 
the model and the extent to which it can be used for policy analysis. 
This chapte r de sc ribe s the majo r limitations to the model and the 
implications of the current results. 
6.2 Limitations of the Model 
6.2.1 Assumptions About Wheat Supply 
In the model the long- run wheat suppl y functions fo r the South 
Island produ ctlon regions we re assumed to be of constant quality, 
completely inelastic and representative of a year of self-sufficiency. 
Although this is clearly an unrealistic representation of supply, 
this does not severely limit the interpretation of results. 
Because in the low cost solutions all wheat arriving in the 
North Island is received from bulk ship, the structure of the model 
is such that once wheat is loaded aboard ship, per unit marketing 
costs thereafter are independent of the source of the wheat. There-
fore, the rationalised structure of milling in the No rth Island is 
independent of the sources from which its milling grade wheat is 
derived. The implication of this is that the market structure of 
the industry in the North Island shown in the low co st colutions, 
would be unaffected by changes in supply, assuming both islands 
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remain sel£- sufficient in the production of flour. This is impo rtant 
for it suggests that in years of domestic shortfall, the need to 
import Australian wheat would not affect what might be a rational 
market and industrial structure tn the North Island. 
In the South Island it is possible that a mill in one or more 
of the regions between Dunedin and Christchurch may be viable 
if the uncertainties of supply were acknowledged in the model. 
McCarthy et. al. (1971) outline how it wOl.lld be possible to test the 
stability of plant locations to changes in regional production. Also 
Higham et. al. show that heuristic search procedures could be 
used for this purpose. Although this would be a logical extension 
of the study, it is unlikely that South Island milling allocations 
would alter significantly if the model had been tested with the actual 
levels of regional production achieved in the recent years. The 
only major Lmplication arising from the simplistic assumptions 
about the wheat supply would appear to be that spatial equilibrium 
prices and quantities can not be determined directly from the 
model. However, if estimates of long-run regional supply functions 
were available the re are ite rative - reactive programming technique s 
which could allow the incorporation of supply functions in the model. 
This would be a worthwhile extension of the model and would pro-
vide valuable information for policy makers concerned with New 
Zealand wheat pricing. 
6.2.2 Assumptions About Final Demand 
De spite the wide disparitie s between the regional flour price 
differentials of the South and North Islands, the assumed, com-
pletely inelastic, demand for flour is not seen as a serious limita-
tion of the modeL Even if regional price differentials were reflected 
in the flour price, the significant decline in the South Isla'1d price 
could not be expected to create a significant change in the local 
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consumption of £lour. A more serious limitation may have arisen 
from assuming that the industry produces only one product, a single 
quality £lour. 
As Bor rell (1980, Figure 2.1) show s, wheat is used to produce 
a range of products. The demands for these products require mills 
to produce several lines of flour and also bran a.!:1d pollard to stock-
foods. Ignoring the fact that there are different flours may be to 
ignore an essential economic force of the market. It may involve 
considerable expense to shut down the rollers at a mill to cl ea.Cl 
machinery and change over to a different line of flour. Larger 
production runs l'nay be cheaper, emphasisLng the need for either 
flour storage facilities or for specialised mills. Large mills could 
produce flour for bread baking while smaller mills could produce 
flours for biscuits, cakes and household uses. No attempt has 
been made in this study to take account of the implications the pro-
duction of alte rnative type s of flour might have upon the location, 
numbe r or size of mill s. DiHe rent qualitie s of wheat available in 
different supply regions may be more suitable as supply posts for 
a mill that might specialise in, say, household £lours. This may 
hold implications as where best to locate such a mill. 
The demand for braCl and ;Jollard by stockfood manufacture rs 
similarly may hold implications for the location, number and size 
of mills. No attempt has been made to identify any such implication. 
6.2.3 Importation of Australian Flour 
Another factor which may hold implications for rationalising 
mills is the possibility of importing flour from Australia. 
A pape r from the Flour Mille rs 1 Council of Aust ralia dated 
8 May 1979 suggests that if substantial orders were placed, 
Australian flour could be purchased for $206.00 per tonne net, 
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free alongside ship, packed -:'n 50 kllo jutes. This could mean 
Australian flour might be competitive with No rth Island milled 
flour, although quality diffe rential s and the co st of shipping would 
':lave to be considered to evaluate the econoluic via~ility of this 
alternative. No consideration has been given to this factor in the 
study. If this alternative was viable it is possible that Sydney could 
supply North Island final demand areas rather than North Island 
flour mill s. 
6.2.4 Coastal Shipments of Flour 
The fact that it was as sumed feasible to use a speci.alised 
bulk ship for wheat raises two important questions. 
(i) Would it be feasible to use a specialised ship 
to transport the equivalent flour and what 
implications might thi s create, and 
(ii) would it be feasible to backload flour from 
No rth Island mill s aboard the specialised 
bulk ship and what implications might this 
hold? 
Solutions to these problems are not given in this stUdy. How-
ever, if estimates of the costs of such proposals were available 
these could be easily incorporated i.n the model. 
6.2.5 The Dynamics of Ship12Lng and Storag&.. 
Bor rell (1980, Chapte r 3) discusse s the trade -off between 
lower per unit costs of bulk shipping bJlarger vessels on occasional 
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voyages and the increased per U:1.it capital cost of build:'ng larger 
21 
Assuming it was possible to charter large bulk ships currently 
serving the Australian .=xport trade. These could "be chartered 
on a monthly basis. 
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and perha;?s more numerous storage facilities necessary to facili-
tate intermittent shipping. The static model does not allow the 
size of ship or the size of storage facilities to vary. There are 
assumed to be fixed ~n actual size, although their throughputs are 
able to vary. 
It is po s sible that the static model could be used to determine 
annual trade flows which could then be used as inputs to a dynamic 
model. The dynamic model could then be used to show how annual 
trade flow s should be scheduled throughout the year, what size of 
ship or ships would need to be charte red, and what might be the 
maximum size of storage facility required at anyone location. 
The exclusion of dynamic effects in the model of this studf 
is seen more as an opportunity to extend the problem rather than 
a limitation of the model, although it is possible that economies 
of scale associated with the 'dfnamic problem may have implications 
for the degree of centralisation of milling in the North Island and 
for the centralisation of port loading a'1d unloadi:ng facilities. 
6.2.6 Uncertainties of the Dat~ 
In presenti.ng the data of the model in cb,a;?ter four, attention 
was drawn to the limitation of some of that data. In particular, the 
crude estimate required for the milling cost curve and the arbitrary 
assUlnptions made to calculate scale cost curves for two North 
Island ports. The implications arising from the uncertain 'data 
are that the specific characteristics of a.'1y low cost solution must 
be treated with cautLon, and that only general principles concern-
ing is sues of market structure can be identified. 
For a more rigorous a.'1alysis, more accurate data would -:)e 
needed. It is likel y that the Wheat Board would have muc h of the 
data needed for these purposes and the model could easily be 
re -e stimated using new data. 
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Anothe r me thod tha t could be used to ove rcome the uncertain-
tie s of the da ta used would be to conduct sensitivity te sting. This 
could be conducted by changing the parameters of the various cost 
curves of the transport costs in a systema tic fashion in successive' 
runs of the model. Hence it would be possible to identify how the 
solution might change over a range and combination of alternative 
transport and cost curves. Although this might reduce the U.:1cer-
tainties as to what might be a suitable market structure, one 
limitation would be the many possible combinations of curves that 
could be tested. 
6.3 Implications of Model Results 
The results of the model show how changes in market struc-
ture could lead to a lowering of total industry co sts. They do llQ..i;.. 
show how market conduct should or would change given the type 
of structural changes required. However, some interesting impli-
ca tions regarding market conduct do arise from the solutions of 
the model. 
In the model it is assumed that the market conduct is that 
of a perfectly competitive industry. Hence the objective function 
of the model seeks to minimise total costs. However, the market 
structure suggested by the low cost solutions of the model is not 
necessarily consistent with a perfectly competitive industry. For 
instance, each mill of the solution has a potential spatial monopoly. 
For this reason, the removal of those constraints representing 
Government controls in the model does not necessarily imply that 
the abolition of controls in the industry will lead to a rationalised 
market struc ture where costs are minimised. 
When a competitive structure does not apply, the findings 
of the type of market model used in this study only established a 
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rna rket struc ture norm that e stima te s the near maximum economic 
surplus (gain or saving) that could be obtained, but says nothing of 
the market conduct required to achi.eve this economic surplus. 
Cassidy and Kilminster (1975) give an example of how a similar 
market model to that used in this study has been incorrectly inter-
preted and the polic y recommenda tion arising from the solutions 
of that model are partly invalid. The problem arose because it 
was assumed that competitive conduct would prevail despite the 
fact tha t an imperfec Uy competitive market structure wa s sugge s ted 
by the model. To overcome such problems it is necessary to 
interpret re sults in light of the economic theory rela ting to impe r-
fect competition. The implication arises: how does the theory of 
market conduct and imperfect competition rela te to the normative 
market struc ture derived by the model of this study. 
The low cost solutions of the study suggest a !leed for inte-
gration, co-ordination and for bargaining power. These all arise 
from the fact that the market structure of the solutions i.ndicates 
the need for centralisation. A consequence of this would ~e that 
monopoly powers could emerge in the milling a!ld transport sectors. 
While these centralised orga!lisations might be capable of integrat-
ing and co-ordinating the market, the theory of countervailing 
power, however, might suggest that because of the atomistic farm 
structure at the beginning of the marketing chain, and also that 
of bakeries and consumers at the other e:ld, the interest of farmers 
a!ld bake rie s 1na:r onl y- be protected by- the pre sence of 0 ne i ndepe:1-
de!lt orga!lisation with strong bargaining power. An alternative would 
be to have three separate groups forming countervailing forces 
against the monopolie s. 
An obvious extension of this studl would be to attempt to 
consider this problem but it must be kept in mind that the model 
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only provides s'olutions showing the results of long term structural 
change s. The refore in a~swe ring the que stions above, conside ration 
must be given as to what conduct would ;:)e necessary to bring about 
restructuring in the transition phase a~d how best to achieve such 
conduct. 
The second half of the Governme::1t wheat and flour marketing 
polic y discus sed in chapte r two tnvol ved the Gove rnment fixed wheat 
and flour prices and the margins paid to millers. Even though com-
petitive spatial equilibrium prices were used in the modd to identify 
where other cost savings might be made in the industry, it does not 
necessarily imply that price setting conduct should be that of a free 
market. It is pos sible that if the market could be structured with 
appropriately cou'1.te rvailing groups, the pricing conduct of the industry 
could perhaps be left to free market forces to detennine spatial 
equilibrium price s. Howeve r, complications introduced by fluctuating 
world commodity prices and equity considerations may mean prices 
are best set by Government. In this case the results of the model 
showing regional price differentials can be thought of as useful 
supplementary information that policy makers consider in making 
their deci sions. An obvious extension of the model might be to try 
and tie up spatial aspects of pricing to the other pricing problems 
of the industry. 
In conclusion, it must be stated that the results of this study 
only establish a market norm; they only show what could be poss-
ible, they do not specify what policy measures are -required to 
achieve such a norm. In this way the results provide a~ indication 
of the direction fo r the industry and, the refore implications for the 
Gove rnment 1 s wheat and Hour marketing polic y. 
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Ayerage Flour Price Paid to Millers from 1 February 1978 
Calc ula ted by Department of Trade and Indus try 
(Source: New Zealand Flour Millers I As socia tion, 1979). 
Wheat Cost, 135 x 1.287 
Conversion Cost, i.e. 780/0 extraction 
Standard Profit Margin 
$ tonne 




Revenue from the sale of Bran and Pollard by-produced 
is thought to pay for the commission and discount made to the 
Wheat Board for the sale of flour. 





In wheat equivalents, this is 27.46/1.28 = $21.45 per tonne. 
Allowing for 15 per cent inflation between February 1978 and May 1979, 
$21. 45 x 1. 1 5 = $24. 67. 
Although it is not known whether the Department of Trade 
and Industry used the average size of mill to calculate this average 
margin, it is useful to note that the average size of mill handles 




Fixed Annual Charges for 6,000 Tonne Bulk Ship 
Capital $10 m. /15 years 
Interest 12 per cent 
Opera ting Co s t 
Annual Operating Cost 
Salaries and Wages 
Master 




Cook and Steward 















Repairs and Maintenance 
Insurance ($10 m. x .01 ) 
Management 

















(Source: Two Priva te Transport Companie s and Ministry of Transport). 
129. 
130. 
To charter a similar vessel on the World spot market 
for one year would cost $1.9 m. - this excludes fuel and port 
charges. (New Zealand Shipping Corporation Figures, 1979). 
Opera ting Days Using 6,000 Tonne Bulk Ship 
Routes Sea Miles Days @ 14 m. It. h. 




















Assuming the most time demanding possibility 
200, 000 tonnes Sydney - Mount Mallnganui 
200, 000/6, 000 = 33 trips 
Da ys for re tur n journey to North Island - 8 
Day-s for loading/unloading 2 
10 










A larger ship could be purchased to allow a greater nllmber of free 
days. The extra capital cost would not be great. 
APPENDIX 3 
Standardised Flour Price and Average 
Financial Co s t of the Industrv 
Marketing costs for the industry were approxima tel 'I $20 m. 
for 1978. These were incurred in producing approximately 290, 000 
wheat equivalent tonnes of flour (see section 5.2.2). Therefore, the 
average marketing costper (W.E.) tonne = $20 m./.29 
= $68.97. 
Converting to flour $68.97 x 1.28 = $88.28 per tonne 
For the year ended 31 January 1979, the average cost per 
tonne for whea t including storage and brokerage paid by the Wheat 
Board was: 
$35,532,925/292,755 tonnes = $124.79/tonne. 
(Source: New Zealand Wheat Board 13th Annual Report). 
Allowing for 15 per cent inflation to adjust to 1979 prices 
$124.79 xl. 1 5 = $143. 51 • 
Converting from whea t to flour 
$143.51 x 1.28 = $183.69. 
Adding the marketing cost component 
$183.69 + $88.28 = $271.97. 
This cost is close to the price charged for flour in bulk and 
sacks throughout New Zealand effective from 16 February 1979; 
this was $270.00 per tonne. 
(Source: New Zealand Wheat Board, 1979). 
Although the financial costs of the industry are close to the 
price charged for flour, this does not necessarily mean the. ~Jrice 
charged is close to the social cost of the industry. For instance, 
131. 
132. 
by preventing imports of Australian wheat and flour, this may 
impose an opportunity cost on consumers; that is, it might result 
i.n flour being more expensive than it otherwise could be. This 
would represent an additional social cost of the industry. 
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